# live-conformance/keys — key release

The corpus of [`extensions/key-release.md`](../../extensions/key-release.md) §12: logs of a
signing proxy, each over commitment lists (`WKL1`) derived from CPIX documents, with the
outcome its verification reaches (§10).

**Log equivalence.** For each vector, a conforming key-release verifier given its
`authorities`, `proxies`, `lists` (each named in the top-level `lists`, as hexadecimal of its
bytes), its `cpix` documents (each the file `file`, with the index in `lists` of the list it is
derived from), its `log` (form-2 `wai.video.keys` receipts in the JSON of §8.2, in the order
the proxy signed them) and its `tickets` (`WKT1`, hexadecimal) reaches the outcome the vector
states:

- `refuse`: the `reason` (§11) and where, `at`: `["list", i]`, `["cpix", i]`, `["receipt", i]`
  or `["ticket", i]` (§10.2);
- `accept`: for each receipt (§10.3), its `identity`, `decision` (§7.2) and `released`; the
  `keys` it released, each its `kid` and `key_commit`; and its `licence_expiry` and `renewal`.

A verifier that reaches another outcome, reason, place or fact does not conform.

The accepted logs give: streaming releases over two content protection systems, forwarded and
answered (`release_drm`, one receipt carrying a metered figure with its class); an HLS key
file and Clear Key releases by ticket, the key never relayed by the proxy
(`release_hls_key_uri`, `release_clear_key`); every refusal of §7.2 checks 1 to 8 (`refusals`,
`expired_entitlement`, `release_time`), the last over a list of version 2 whose release time
refuses every request decided before it, whatever its entitlement, and releases from it on;
key rotation over three periods (`rotation`); offline licences, their
renewal, their count, their lapse and their clamp to the entitlement (`offline`); and granted
requests the licence server refused or did not answer (`upstream_refused`); a limit of two
sessions streaming at once over a window of ten minutes, with the releases each decision
counted, a session that keeps its place by asking again, a release that lapses, and a group
whose records state two limits, which is undecided (`streams`); and an output level required,
released on a statement of an accepted class and undecided where none establishes a level
(`output`); one grant whose group is named for each content, streaming a film and an episode
at once under a limit of one, and another grant whose one group limits both
(`streams_per_content`, §14.7). The receipts of those logs are of form 3 (§14.5), a vector that
gives a verifier attesters states them in `attesters`, and an accepted form-3 receipt states its
`leases`. An entitlement authority's revocations (§16) of a session and of a group refuse
`DeniedRevoked` from their instant on, before a stale request is read as stale and after an
invalid entitlement is read as invalid, and name nothing else: not another authority's session of
the same bytes, another session, another group, or a group whose bytes a session's revocation
carries (`revoked`, given two authorities); a vector that gives a verifier revocations states
them in `revocations`, each a `WKR1` in hexadecimal. A content whose keys come in two spans
(§4.6) is a chain of the channel's list and `channel_next`, a list of version 3 extending it,
each derived from its CPIX document: the next span's key is unknown before its list is held and
released after, and a key of each span is released together (`extended`); lists that do not
extend the chain (one whose named list is not given, one with a period no later, one signed by
another key, one restating a KID, two extending one list, and one with a key of no period) are
refused. A log with two checkpoints (§17) holds, among its lines, the proxy's signed checkpoints:
the first leaves out a release two days old, a session's earlier release and a licence that
lapsed, and keeps one proof, two sessions' last releases and a licence; after it a replay of the
kept proof is refused, a third session counts the two releases it keeps, the kept licence is
renewed and the lapsed one's renewal is unknown; the second names the first (`checkpointed`). The
same log gone on from its first checkpoint gets the same decisions (`from_checkpoint`). An
accepted log with checkpoints states their identities in `checkpoints`. Its negative controls
leave out a proof, a release or a licence, miscount, name no previous checkpoint
(`checkpoint_mismatch` each), keep a lapsed licence, change a signature, sign by another proxy
(`checkpoint_invalid` each), date a receipt before the checkpoint it follows
(`checkpoint_mismatch`), restate a decision as the whole log would make it, or restate the replay
after the checkpoint as a release (`decision_mismatch`). Each `n_` vector
is a negative control, refused with a reason of §11; together they give every reason.

**Provenance.** Generated here: `wai_key_release_vectors gen` writes every file from logs
authored in code, from fixed seeds. Each principal's Ed25519 key (the key holder, the
entitlement authority, an untrusted authority, the proxy, an untrusted proxy, three devices, an
attester, an untrusted attester, two packagers and a second entitlement authority) is
SHA-256 of a fixed label; each content key, KID and session is SHA-256 of a fixed label,
truncated. Every time is a constant (the corpus's `t0` is 2026-10-25T00:00:00Z), every origin
is an `.example` name (RFC 2606), the three system IDs are values of the DASH-IF registry of
content protection system identifiers, and Ed25519 signing is deterministic (RFC 8032), so
every file is the same bytes on every machine. The CPIX documents are written for the corpus
with their keys in the clear (CPIX §8.1 calls that not recommended outside a test); the
encrypted one holds a cipher value that is SHA-256 of a fixed label and decrypts to nothing.
The licence challenges and licences are fixed strings, never a content protection system's
messages. The generator asserts that each vector reaches the outcome it was written to have,
and that the corpus gives every reason of §11 and every decision of §7.2, before it writes. No
recorded data.

**The key provider.** `provider.json` holds exchanges with a reference key provider (§15): for
each, the request, the provider's signed receipt and, for a provision, the answer and the
commitment list derived from it, with whether the provider's log already held the request's
proof (`seen`). A conforming verifier given the case's `providers` and the file's `requesters`
and `contents` reaches the stated outcome (§15.5): `accept`, with the receipt's identity and
decision and the keys the list commits to, or `refuse`, with its reason. The cases give five
provisions (two keys; three keys with a period each; a content with a release time; two keys of
a content whose key periods are a schedule; two keys of the keyed source), every refusal of
§15.3 (among them three of `DeniedPeriodUnknown`: a period past the schedule's count, an index
whose window is another period's, and a key with no period), and negative controls for every
reason of §15.5, among them an answer whose key is not the one the list commits to
(`n_response_not_the_lists`, `cpix_mismatch`) and an off-schedule key provided by a provider told
no schedule (`n_off_schedule_provided`, `provider_decision_mismatch`). A content that has a
schedule states it in `contents` (`origin`, `length`, `count`), and a verifier is told it. Every
key is derived from the file's `seed` by the test derivation of §15.3, or, for a case whose
`source` is `secret`, from the file's `secret` by the keyed derivation; both are test values that
attest nothing.

## Layout

- `provider.json`: the key provider's exchanges, above.
- `vectors.json`: `t0`, `principals` (the keys, by name, informative), `lists` and `vectors`.
- `film.cpix.xml`, `episode.cpix.xml`, `channel.cpix.xml`, `channel-next.cpix.xml`: the CPIX
  documents the lists are derived from (`channel` with three key periods, and `channel-next`
  with the three after them); `encrypted.cpix.xml`, a document whose key
  is encrypted (`cpix_unsupported`); `broken.cpix.xml`, one that is not well-formed
  (`cpix_malformed`).

The second implementation is [`../key_release_verify.py`](../key_release_verify.py), written
from the extension's text and sharing no code with `wai-rs`:

    python3 -I live-conformance/key_release_verify.py live-conformance/keys