# joule-ui conformance vectors — v1

Deterministic vectors for independent joule-ui implementations (SPEC §8).
Regenerate with:

```
cargo run -p joule-ui-conformance --bin gen_vectors
```

A conforming implementation reproduces these from the published JSON alone —
that is what makes joule-ui a vendor-neutral standard rather than one library's
behaviour. Fixed Ed25519 steward key (`0x17`×32, published, attests nothing) and
fixed meter steps make every vector reproducible.

| Vector | Class | What a conformant implementation must do |
|---|---|---|
| `c1-validation.json` | **C1 — surface validation** | Run `validate(tree, registry)` over both surfaces. The valid one yields **no** errors; the invalid one yields the **exhaustive** list (every planted fault — unknown widget, missing required prop, mistyped prop, forbidden child — not just the first). |
| `c2-interaction.json` | **C2 — interaction metering** | `run_interaction` over a deterministic meter (step 4200 µJ) reproduces the `Interaction`: `allow`, energy `4200 µJ [HwShunt]`, and the content addresses of surface, inputs, and outputs. The surface id is the BLAKE3 of the canonical `valid_surface` JSON; inputs/outputs are content-addressed, never embedded. |
| `c3-authorization.json` | **C3 — authorization** | A zero-budget `Authorizer` denies the action **before** the handler runs: `expected_handler_ran` is `false`, the verdict is `deny("budget-exceeded")`, and the outputs are the genesis sentinel. A conformant runtime MUST NOT execute a denied action's handler. |
| `c4-chain.json` | **C4 — chain integrity** | `verify_chain` accepts the three-link chain (allow, allow, deny). Removing index 1 MUST break it **at index 1**: every signature verifies, `seq` increments from zero, and each link's `prev` is the prior link's content id, so no interaction can be excised, reordered, or mutated without detection. |
| `MANIFEST.json` | — | Verify each vector's BLAKE3 content address before relying on it. |

## What conformance pins, and what it does not

joule-ui pins the **protocol and the receipt**, not the product surfaces around
them. There is no renderer vector (the renderer is the host's), no transport
vector (the consumer's — MCP/SSE/Web MoQ), and no widget-library vector (product
surface). The metering and capability mechanisms are **recognized edges** (SPEC
§9): C2/C3/C4 use a deterministic stub meter and a stub budget so the vectors are
reproducible, while a deployment wires the Sandbox `PowerMeter` (a hardware
reading while a vendor counter is live, its labelled estimate otherwise) and a
JCP grant. The stub meter declares `HwShunt` explicitly, so C2 and C4 exercise
the reading path of the signed core (`measured_uj` present); like the steward
key, that grade is a fixture and attests nothing. Outside the pack, a meter that
declares no grade is `Estimator` (SPEC §5). What conformance guarantees is the load-bearing claim — that an
interaction is validated, authorized-before-running, metered, and sealed into a
tamper-evident chain, identically across implementations.