# WAI Extension: Reproducible-Reconstruction Binding

> Status: Draft. A cryptographic **hard binding over the deterministically
> decoded pixels** of a neural-coded asset — the reconstruct-side analogue of
> the [Asset Provenance](provenance.md) extension, and a bridge from WAI's
> byte-exact decode into C2PA / JPEG Trust provenance. Reference impl: the
> `reconstruction_binding` module of `wai-rs` (feature `provenance`).
> Keywords **MUST**, **MUST NOT**, **SHOULD**, **MAY** are RFC 2119/8174.

## 1. Scope and model

A provenance manifest binds itself to an asset with a **hard binding**: a
cryptographic hash over the asset's bytes. For neural-coded media that hash
covers the *compressed* codestream. A hard binding over the *decoded image* is
possible only when the decode is reproducible: where two conformant decoders may
produce different pixels, a hash of the decoded image is not portable across
implementations, and provenance over the rendered result falls back to fuzzy
**soft** bindings (perceptual hashes, watermarks), which are approximate and
spoofable.

This is not incidental to the codec. The JPEG AI standard (ISO/IEC 6048 /
ITU-T T.840) defines its normative bit-exact conformance point at the **output
of the entropy decoder**, not at reconstruction to pixels; and its multi-branch
design specifies **up to three synthesis transforms** (`decoderID` 0/1/2), any of
which produces a conformant reconstruction of the same codestream. Reconstruction
to pixels is therefore, by design, **not** required to be bit-exact, and one
codestream may legally decode to different images. A hash of the decoded pixels is
not portable under the base standard.

Over a capability registered at `decode-equivalence` — WAI's integer-exact
decoders, `wai.neural.int_hyper` and the other `NeuralIntegerExact` capabilities
([determinism-tiers](determinism-tiers.md) §5) — every conforming sink
reconstructs the same pixels, so the decoded-pixel hash is portable by
construction.

`wai.image.jpegai` is registered at `entropy-consistency`, the tier of the base
standard's conformance point. WAI's exact JPEG AI decoder nevertheless reconstructs
to RGB **deterministically** — one pinned reconstruction, reproducible across
machines under stated conditions. Its entropy decode and its hyper-decoder,
context-model and synthesis networks are integer; dequantisation, latent
refinement, the post-filter chain (including the eICCI post-filter, a float CNN)
and colour conversion run in IEEE-754 float with a fixed evaluation order, in the
default floating-point environment, which the decoder checks before decoding. It
implements one configuration: 256×256 4:4:4, `model_id` 0 (tools_0),
`beta_displacement_log` 0, the high-operation-point synthesis (so a binding over its
output carries `decoderId` 2), and the other header conditions in
[determinism-tiers](determinism-tiers.md) §5. The reference sink refuses codestreams
outside that configuration. Within it, a sink without the integer weight bundle, or
in a non-default floating-point environment, falls back to a float decode whose
pixels are not pinned, and no binding applies to its output. The pinned
reconstruction is a property of the exact decoder, not of the capability: its
reproducibility rests on that decoder's build and on the process's floating-point
environment ([determinism-tiers](determinism-tiers.md) §5–§6). Within those
conditions it restores the precondition a hard binding needs — a stable hash of the
decoded pixels — for a verifier that runs the same decoder (§2). This extension
expresses that hash as a provenance assertion.

A `reconstruction-binding` is **not a content capability**. The asset declares an
ordinary capability (`wai.image.jpegai`, `wai.neural.int_hyper`, …) and is carried
and decoded normally; the binding is metadata *about* the decoded result, the way
[`provenance`](provenance.md) is metadata about the carried bytes.

## 2. The binding

A binding is a hash plus the descriptor that makes the decode reproducible:

```json
{
  "alg": "sha256",
  "hash": "<lowercase hex SHA-256 over the canonical decoded pixels>",
  "reconstruction": {
    "decoderId":  2,          // the pinned synthesis branch (multi-branch codecs;
                              // 2 for wai.image.jpegai's exact decoder)
    "profile":    "<id>",     // codec profile
    "level":      "<id>",     // codec level
    "width":      256,
    "height":     256,
    "format":     "RGB8",     // canonical: row-major, 3 bytes/pixel, no padding, no alpha
    "colorSpace": "bt709"
  }
}
```

- **Hash algorithm** — `sha256` (the C2PA default; every C2PA validator supports
  it). MUST be an algorithm in the C2PA hash-algorithm registry.
- **Canonical buffer** — the hash is computed over the decoded image as a `RGB8`
  buffer: row-major, three bytes per pixel, no row padding, no alpha, exactly
  `width * height * 3` bytes. No other pre-processing.
- **The descriptor is part of the binding.** A multi-branch codec decodes one
  codestream several ways; a verifier MUST decode under exactly the descriptor's
  `decoderId`, `profile`, and `level` before hashing, or the comparison is
  meaningless. The descriptor pins the one reconstruction the hash is over.

Conformance criterion:

- Over a capability registered at **decode-equivalence** (see
  [determinism-tiers](determinism-tiers.md)), a verifier that decodes the
  codestream with any conforming decoder under the binding's descriptor, hashes the
  canonical `RGB8` buffer, and compares MUST obtain the recorded `hash`.
- Over `wai.image.jpegai` (registered at `entropy-consistency`), the hash is over
  the reconstruction of WAI's exact decoder (§1). A verifier MUST decode with that
  decoder — not the float fallback — in the default floating-point environment,
  and then MUST obtain the recorded `hash`. A verifier that decodes any other way
  has not checked the binding: a mismatch it finds is not evidence that the asset
  changed, and it MUST NOT report the binding as failed on that basis. The
  reference dispatch (`decode_envelope`) does not report which path ran, so a
  verifier calls the exact decoder directly (`jpegai_decode::decode`), which
  refuses rather than falls back.

## 3. C2PA / JPEG Trust carriage

C2PA (and JPEG Trust, ISO/IEC 21617-1, which is built on the C2PA architecture)
has **no standard assertion that hashes decoded/rendered pixels** — every standard
hard binding (`c2pa.hash.data`, `c2pa.hash.boxes`, `c2pa.hash.bmff`) hashes the
compressed bytes. A reproducible-reconstruction binding is therefore expressed as a
**custom assertion**, using C2PA's reverse-domain labelling for third-party
assertions:

- **Assertion label:** `science.transaction.wai.hash.reconstruction`
- **Body:** the object in §2, serialized as a CBOR map (the C2PA assertion
  serialization). Field names map 1:1 to the JSON above:
  `alg` (text), `hash` (byte string), and `reconstruction` (a map of
  `decoderId` (uint), `profile`/`level`/`format`/`colorSpace` (text),
  `width`/`height` (uint)).
- **Placement:** this assertion is **additional**. A manifest SHOULD still carry a
  standard hard binding (`c2pa.hash.data` over the codestream) referenced by the
  claim's `created_assertions`, so it is valid in any C2PA validator; the
  reconstruction binding sits **beside** it. The byte-binding proves *these
  compressed bytes*; the reconstruction binding upgrades that to *and anyone who
  decodes them per this descriptor obtains this exact image* (for
  `wai.image.jpegai`, anyone who decodes them with the exact decoder, §2).
- **Signature:** the assertion is covered by the C2PA claim signature like any
  other, so it is tamper-evident.

The digest is the same value WAI's own receipt carries (§4), so a validator with a
WAI decoder reaches a matching hash whether it reads the C2PA CBOR assertion or the
WAI receipt.

## 4. WAI receipt carriage

The binding MAY be carried in a WAI receipt alongside an [asset
provenance](provenance.md) receipt: provenance binds the opaque asset bytes
(content-hash-equivalence, BLAKE3 over the envelope); this binds the reconstructed
pixels (SHA-256 over the canonical RGB — decode-equivalence, or for
`wai.image.jpegai` the exact decoder's pinned reconstruction). Together they cover
both halves of the thesis — the bytes that are carried and the pixels that are
reconstructed. The reference impl emits the §2 JSON via
`ReconstructionBinding::to_json`.

## 5. Machine-readable AI-content marking

A reproducible-reconstruction binding is a substrate for **machine-readable marking
of AI-processed media**. Where a regime requires content to be marked in a
machine-readable, detectable format (for example EU AI Act Article 50, whose
transparency obligations apply from 2 August 2026, with the technical marking
standards developed via the Code of Practice), a signed assertion that binds the
*reconstructed* content — carried through the neural coding step rather than
invalidated by it — is a mechanism that survives decode. WAI states this as a
capability (a signed, reproducible binding over decoded content); it does not make
a legal claim, and any deployment MUST confirm sufficiency against the applicable
regime.

## 6. Reference implementation

`wai-rs`, feature `provenance`, module `reconstruction_binding`:
`ReconstructionDescriptor`, `ReconstructionBinding::{bind, verify, hash_hex,
to_json, C2PA_LABEL}`. `bind` hashes the canonical `RGB8` buffer under a
descriptor; `verify` re-hashes a freshly decoded buffer and compares. The digest is
a plain SHA-256, reproducible by any SHA-256 implementation — which is what makes it
portable into a C2PA validator.