a437feb8ab
openpay/
compliance/ PCI-DSS readiness package (scope-map,
pci-zero-architecture, hsm-kms-guidance,
qsa-checklist), citing PCI-DSS v4.0.1
requirements. (#1)
examples/pci-zero/ Runnable example demonstrating a deployment
where merchant code never touches a PAN. (#1)
crates/op-core/ Tokenized<Card> typestate + NetworkToken
+ CardNetwork + Cryptogram. (#2)
crates/op-rails-card/network_token/
NetworkTokenProvider trait + VTS adapter
+ MDES adapter, with deterministic stubs
behind a 'live' feature flag. (#2)
crates/op-driver-sdk/conformance/network_token.rs
Conformance harness for third-party
NetworkTokenProvider implementations. (#2)
crates/op-cli/src/ledger/ 'openpay ledger as-of' subcommand for
bi-temporal queries. (#3)
crates/op-orchestrator/src/telemetry.rs
OpenTelemetry span emission per
Payment<S> transition with semantic-
conventions tags. (#3)
docs/observability/ Grafana dashboard JSON + wiring guide
for the bi-temporal ledger lens. (#3)
smart-byte/
smart-byte-rs/ Rust reference implementation: envelope
encode/decode (canonical CBOR + BLAKE3
content addressing), Ed25519 sign +
verify, lockstep BFT commit MVP, Iroh
transport scaffold, CLI. (#4)
spec/identity_and_key_rotation.md
Adopts KERI SAIDs + key-event log
format; explicitly does not adopt ACDC
chaining wholesale. (#5)
conformance/v1/ 21 test vectors covering canonicalisation,
SAID computation, signature verification,
lockstep commit, gossip propagation.
CI gate enforces spec/vector coupling. (#6)
eoc/
eoc-rs/ Rust + WASM reference implementation:
4-stage cascade (cache -> kv -> graph ->
neural), joule counters via RAPL / NVML /
powermetrics, CLI, wasm-bindgen surface.
18 tests pass. (#7)
eoc-bench/ Benchmark harness, MT-Bench and Router
case sets, 'joules per MT-Bench point'
metric, 'eoc-bench run | compare' CLI. (#8)
standards/sci-for-ai-submission.md
Submission proposal mapping EOC's
receipt schema to GSF SCI-for-AI. (#9)
cookbook/ HuggingFace-style cookbook (markdown +
runnable Python) demonstrating EOC's
cascade with HF AI Energy Score. (#9)
docs/bench-v0.md Reproducibility doc for eoc-bench.
Workspace state:
- openpay clippy -- -D warnings: clean across all touched crates
- smart-byte-rs cargo test --workspace + clippy: clean
- eoc-rs cargo test --workspace + clippy: clean (18 tests)
- eoc-bench cargo check --workspace + clippy + 15 tests: clean
Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 pinned at the open-standards root via
rust-toolchain.toml; every workspace inherits.
Closes #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9.
52 lines
3.8 KiB
JSON
52 lines
3.8 KiB
JSON
[
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{
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"name": "sig-001-known-key-known-said",
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"description": "Positive: sign a known envelope SAID with a known Ed25519 signing key, expect a deterministic signature. Ed25519 (RFC 8032) is deterministic, so the signature is reproducible across implementations.",
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"envelope_said": "EBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB",
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"signing_key_seed": "9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60",
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"verifying_key": "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a",
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"signature": "e5564300c360ac729086e2cc806e828a84877f1eb8e5d974d873e065224901555fb8821590a33bacc61e39701cf9b46bd25bf5f0595bbe24655141438e7a100b",
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"expected_verify": true,
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"error": null
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},
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{
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"name": "sig-002-verify-positive",
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"description": "Positive: verify a signature against the envelope SAID and verifying key it was produced for. Result MUST be true.",
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"envelope_said": "EAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
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"signing_key_seed": "4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb",
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"verifying_key": "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c",
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"signature": "92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00",
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"expected_verify": true,
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"error": null
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},
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{
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"name": "sig-003-tampered-envelope",
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"description": "Negative: verify a signature against a *different* envelope SAID than the one it was produced for. The signature is structurally valid but binds a different SAID; verification MUST return false. This catches the most common attack: an adversary swaps the envelope and forwards the original signature.",
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"envelope_said": "EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
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"signing_key_seed": "4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb",
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"verifying_key": "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c",
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"signature": "92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00",
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"expected_verify": false,
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"error": "signature_does_not_bind_said"
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},
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{
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"name": "sig-004-wrong-key",
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"description": "Negative: verify a signature against the SAID it was produced for, but with a *different* verifying key. Verification MUST return false. This catches the case where an adversary supplies a valid signature from a key that is not the byte's current owner.",
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"envelope_said": "EAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
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"signing_key_seed": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
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"verifying_key": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
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"signature": "92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00",
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"expected_verify": false,
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"error": "verifying_key_does_not_match"
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},
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{
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"name": "sig-005-malformed-signature",
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"description": "Negative: verify a structurally malformed signature (wrong length, in this case 63 bytes instead of 64). Verification MUST return false and the implementation MUST NOT panic or leak timing information distinguishing this case from the cryptographic-failure case.",
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"envelope_said": "EAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
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"signing_key_seed": "4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb",
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"verifying_key": "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c",
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"signature": "92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb",
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"expected_verify": false,
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"error": "malformed_signature_wrong_length"
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}
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]
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