openpay/ (+3 crates)
op-bnpl/ Affirm + Klarna + Afterpay/Clearpay rails. Full lifecycle
typestate (Initiated→Approved→Captured→Settled→Refunded).
Per-provider sandbox+production base URLs, regions (NA/EU/OC
for Klarna; US/AuNz/Gb/Ca/Eu for Afterpay). HMAC-SHA256
webhook verification with constant-time compare. 61 tests.
op-batch/ NACHA ACH (94-char records, PPD/CCD/WEB/TEL/CTX, R01-R99
return codes, Same-Day ACH cutoffs); SEPA pain.001.001.09
(CT) + pain.008.001.08 (DD) with SCT-Inst flagging; Fedwire
MT103/MT202/CHIPS + pacs.008.001.12 / pacs.009.001.10 +
UETR; Bacs Standard 18. Per-rail cutoff scheduler. Exception
taxonomy unified across rails. 51 tests.
op-screening/ OFAC SDN + EU consolidated + UN consolidated + HMT UK
consolidated + Australia DFAT + Canada SEMA + Japan MOF.
Levenshtein + Jaro-Winkler + Soundex + Metaphone + token
Jaccard scoring. Unicode NFKD normalisation + Cyrillic /
Arabic transliteration. Ed25519-signed BLAKE3-chained
audit log. BSA helpers: CTR + SAR pattern detection
(structuring, round-dollar, rapid-in-out). 43 tests.
smart-byte/smart-byte-rs/ (+3 crates)
smart-byte-bbs/ BBS+ signatures (IETF draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-08).
BLS12-381 keys, signatures, disclosure proofs with
cryptographic unlinkability. bbs-2023 Data Integrity
cryptosuite. AnonCreds-shaped link secrets +
predicate proofs. SecretKey zeroize-on-drop. 49 tests.
smart-byte-didcomm/ DIDComm v2 messaging per DIF spec. Pack-encrypted
(ECDH-1PU + ECDH-ES via X25519), pack-signed (JWS),
pack-plaintext. Aries protocols: issue-credential v3,
present-proof v3, basic-message, trust-ping, discover-
features, out-of-band, coordinate-mediation, message-
pickup. Mediator role with pluggable storage. 23 tests.
smart-byte-mdl/ ISO/IEC 18013-5 mobile driver's licence + 18013-7
online presentment. mDoc + MSO with salted-hash
selective disclosure (per item; SHA-256 digest tree).
org.iso.18013.5.1 namespace + AAMVA add-on. ES256
device-auth + issuer-auth. QR-code device-engagement
scaffolding. 28 tests.
eoc/eoc-rs/ (+3 crates)
eoc-local/ Local-inference backends behind one NeuralBackend:
llama.cpp (GGUF, Q4/Q5/Q6/Q8/F16/F32 quantisation),
MLX (Apple Silicon, feature-gated), MLC-LLM (TVM, feature-
gated marker), ONNX Runtime. GGUF file-format reader.
HuggingFace tokenizers. Greedy / top-k / top-p / temperature /
Mirostat samplers. Model registry scanning ~/.eoc/models/.
Joule attribution via eoc-meter. 39 tests.
eoc-rerank/ BM25 sparse + HNSW dense + RRF + min-max hybrid fusion.
Cohere v3.5 + Voyage v2 + bge-reranker v2-m3 + ms-marco
MiniLM + ColBERT v2 rerankers. Two-stage pipeline:
retrieve top-K hybrid → cross-encoder rerank → top-N.
KV-stage recovery shim into the cascade. 31 tests.
eoc-eval/ 15 canonical eval harnesses: MMLU, MMLU-Pro, GPQA,
HumanEval (pass@1 with python3 sandbox), BBH, IFEval (25
verifiable constraints), AlpacaEval, AGIEval, HellaSwag,
ARC (Easy + Challenge), TruthfulQA (MC1+MC2), BoolQ,
GSM8K, MATH (boxed-answer equivalence), Winogrande. Real
questions in BuiltinSamples. EvalRunner emits joules-per-
correct alongside accuracy. 49 tests.
Quality:
- cargo check across all three workspaces: clean
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings on every new crate: clean
- 374 new tests, all passing
- #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across every new crate
- No unwrap/expect outside #[cfg(test)]
Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 (inherited via root rust-toolchain.toml).
99 lines
3.3 KiB
Rust
99 lines
3.3 KiB
Rust
//! Integration test for inbound webhook verification across all three
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//! providers. Positive cases verify the round trip end-to-end; negative
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//! cases exercise the constant-time signature comparison.
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
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use op_bnpl::{
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BnplEventKind, WebhookProvider, verify_affirm_webhook, verify_afterpay_webhook,
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verify_klarna_webhook,
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};
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use sha2::Sha256;
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type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
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fn sign_b64(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> String {
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let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).expect("hmac");
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mac.update(body);
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use base64::Engine;
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base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
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}
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fn sign_hex(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> String {
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let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).expect("hmac");
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mac.update(body);
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hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
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}
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#[test]
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fn affirm_event_round_trip_with_signature() {
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let secret = b"affirm-shared";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"capture.created","charge_id":"CHG_9"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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assert!(verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
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let evt = op_bnpl::webhook::parse_affirm_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(evt.provider, WebhookProvider::Affirm);
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assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::CaptureCreated);
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assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("CHG_9"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn klarna_event_round_trip_with_signature() {
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let secret = b"klarna-shared";
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let body =
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br#"{"event_id":"evt","event_type":"refund.created","order_id":"ORD_9"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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assert!(verify_klarna_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
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let evt = op_bnpl::webhook::parse_klarna_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::RefundCreated);
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assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("ORD_9"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn afterpay_event_round_trip_with_signature() {
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let secret = b"afterpay-shared";
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let body =
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br#"{"id":"evt_a","eventType":"AUTHORISED","paymentId":"PAY_9"}"#;
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let sig = sign_hex(secret, body);
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assert!(verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
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let evt = op_bnpl::webhook::parse_afterpay_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::AuthorizationCreated);
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assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("PAY_9"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn tampered_affirm_body_rejected() {
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let secret = b"k";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e","type":"capture.created"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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let tampered = br#"{"id":"e","type":"refund.created"}"#;
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let r = verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &sig, tampered);
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assert!(matches!(r, Err(op_bnpl::Error::InvalidSignature)));
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}
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#[test]
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fn tampered_afterpay_hex_signature_rejected() {
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let secret = b"k";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e","eventType":"CAPTURED"}"#;
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let mut sig = sign_hex(secret, body);
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// Flip one hex digit to a different one
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let first = sig.chars().next().unwrap();
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let new = if first == 'a' { 'b' } else { 'a' };
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sig.replace_range(..1, &new.to_string());
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let r = verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, &sig, body);
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assert!(matches!(r, Err(op_bnpl::Error::InvalidSignature)));
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}
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#[test]
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fn klarna_malformed_header_rejected() {
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let r = verify_klarna_webhook(b"k", "!!! not base64 !!!", b"{}");
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assert!(matches!(
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r,
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Err(op_bnpl::Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(_))
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));
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}
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