| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
1e435c861a
Latest stable (1.98.0, released 2026-08-18). The pin lives in more places than
is obvious, and missing one means CI silently builds an older compiler than the
dev box:
- rust-toolchain.toml at the repo root
- eoc/eoc-rs/rust-toolchain.toml, a second toolchain file
- five CI workflows that hardcode a version instead of deferring to the file
(wai-conformance, wai-neural-e2e, wai-byte-equality,
joule-code-conformance, jouleclaw-public-surface-documented)
standards-build.yml needed no change, because it reads the toolchain file
rather than pinning inline. That is the pattern the other five should adopt.
MSRV raised to 1.98 across 26 manifests, following the earlier decision to have
the declared floor track the pin rather than drift behind it. Note this is a
support-policy change, not a mechanical one: it narrows which compilers can
consume these standards as libraries.
The pin stays exact, never `stable` — a pin that drifts is not a pin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
| .. | ||
| tests | ||
| Cargo.lock | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
transport-moqt — CommunicationOS transport binding (the last federation layer)
A consumer binding showing a Joule Code collaboration's committed coding
operations carried over CommunicationOS's MoQT transport — the network wire
layer left deferred by spec/collab.md §2.
It closes the loop on the federation stack. The other three layers are already
built and tested in joule-code-collab:
BFT consensus (LockstepCluster), FROST threshold authorization (protected),
and MLS group keying (tests/mls_keying.rs). This example adds the transport.
What it demonstrates
The whole stack, end to end, in one in-process test:
BFT consensus (LockstepCluster) → committed, op_id-ordered coding ops
→ published as MoQT objects over CommunicationOS's transport (inv-moq)
→ each object carries a real Ed25519 / BLAKE3 signed receipt
→ a subscriber receives every op, verifies the signed receipts against the
publisher's key, and recovers the original SignedOp intact
A second test shows the ownerless-trust property: a subscriber that requires receipts rejects a group whose signed receipt does not chain to a trusted publisher key — no central authority decides who is authentic.
The transport
The carrier is inv-moq —
joulesperbit's MoQT (Media over QUIC Transport) wire protocol plus its JWP
receipt extension, the CommunicationOS broadcast-media transport. It exposes
Publisher / Subscriber / GroupHandle / Relay traits with object-level
signed provenance and joule receipts.
The test drives inv-moq through its MockFabric, which runs the real
publish/subscribe/receipt machinery in-process — real Ed25519 signatures, real
BLAKE3 merkle receipts — with no QUIC and no network. inv-moq's quic
feature is the real-wire path (quinn/rustls); the trait surface is identical, so
this binding moves to the network by swapping the fabric, not the code.
This is a standalone workspace (path-deps inv-moq from joulesperbit and the
joule-code-* crates), so the standard's reference library stays free of a
joulesperbit dependency — the same discipline as examples/l3-jouleclaw.
Run
cargo test
Expected:
test untrusted_publisher_is_rejected ... ok
test committed_ops_replicate_over_communicationos_moqt_with_signed_receipts ... ok