openpay/ (+3 crates, ~8400 LOC, 162 tests)
op-iso8583/ ISO 8583 messages for direct acquirer / card-network
connectivity. MTIs, primary+secondary bitmaps, full
DE catalogue, BCD/ASCII/EBCDIC/LLVAR/LLLVAR codecs,
five dialects (Visa Base I, Mastercard MDS, Amex GNS,
Discover, JCB), network-management messages
(sign-on/echo/cutover), DE 55 EMV TLV.
op-mobile-wallets/ Apple Pay (ECDH-P256 + AES-256-GCM), Google Pay ECv2
(ECDH + HKDF + AES-256-CTR + HMAC), Samsung Pay. PAN
never leaves the decryption boundary as a String;
lands in VaultRef. No-PAN-leakage assertions per
wallet.
op-routing/ Least-cost routing + MCC-aware routing + intelligent
retry / soft-decline recovery. 231-MCC catalogue.
Real ISO 8583 DE-39 soft/hard decline taxonomies.
smart-byte/smart-byte-rs/ (+3 crates, ~7100 LOC, 96 tests)
smart-byte-vc/ W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0: VCDM, presentations,
Data Integrity proofs (eddsa-jcs-2022), VC-JWT,
SD-JWT (selective disclosure), Bitstring Status
List 2021. Cargo-bridge maps VCs to Smart Byte
envelopes with SAID stability.
smart-byte-did/ W3C DID resolution: did:key (Ed25519/P-256/secp256k1),
did:web (HTTPS), did:peer (numalgo 2+4), did:jwk,
did:ion (feature-gated stub). DID URL dereferencer.
smart-byte-pq/ Post-quantum signatures: ML-DSA-44/65/87 (FIPS 204),
SLH-DSA across 12 parameter sets (FIPS 205), FN-DSA
(draft FIPS 206, feature-gated). Hybrid Ed25519 +
ML-DSA pattern for the transition. Secret-key
zeroize-on-drop.
eoc/eoc-rs/ (+3 crates, ~6450 LOC, 76 tests)
eoc-vendor-api/ NeuralBackend implementations: Anthropic, OpenAI,
Google, Mistral, Cohere, Groq, Together, Fireworks.
SSE streaming. Prompt-caching where supported.
Joule estimates per published energy coefficient
(12-model curated table).
eoc-embeddings/ 21 embedding models behind one Embedder trait:
OpenAI v3 (3), Cohere v3 (3), Voyage (5), Mistral,
Jina, plus local ONNX (BGE x3, nomic, mxbai, GTE,
E5) behind 'local' feature. Matryoshka-style
dimension projection. Per-content-hash cache.
eoc-route-learned/ RouteLLM-style matrix-factorisation router +
multinomial-logreg classifier + LinUCB / Thompson
bandits for online learning. LearnedCascade wraps
the rule-based cascade with a confidence-threshold
skip policy. Synthetic-eval accuracy: MF 0.935,
LogReg 0.980.
Quality:
- cargo check across all three workspaces: clean
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings on every new crate: clean
- 334 new tests total; all passing
- #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across every new crate
- No unwrap/expect outside #[cfg(test)]
Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 (inherited via root rust-toolchain.toml).
151 lines
4.9 KiB
Rust
151 lines
4.9 KiB
Rust
//! VC-JWT — RFC 7519 JWT carrying a Verifiable Credential payload.
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//!
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//! Signing algorithm: EdDSA (Ed25519). Encoding: compact JWS
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//! (`base64url(header) . base64url(payload) . base64url(signature)`).
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//!
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//! Per VCDM 2.0 §6.3 ("Securing Mechanism"), the payload is the
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//! credential JSON itself (no `iss`/`sub`/`iat` shoehorning) — the
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//! VC fields are authoritative.
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use base64::Engine;
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use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
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use ed25519_dalek::{
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Signature, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey, ed25519::signature::Signer,
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};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use crate::credential::VerifiableCredential;
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use crate::error::VcError;
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use crate::proof::JwtProof;
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/// JOSE header for VC-JWT.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct JwtHeader {
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/// Signing algorithm. We support `"EdDSA"`.
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pub alg: String,
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/// Token type. `"vc+jwt"` per VCDM 2.0; legacy issuers use `"JWT"`.
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pub typ: String,
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/// Verification method (key id). Typically a DID URL.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub kid: Option<String>,
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}
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impl JwtHeader {
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/// Header preset for EdDSA / VC-JWT.
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pub fn eddsa(kid: Option<String>) -> Self {
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Self {
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alg: "EdDSA".to_string(),
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typ: "vc+jwt".to_string(),
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kid,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Issue a VC-JWT. The compact serialisation is returned both as a raw
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/// string and wrapped in a [`JwtProof`] for ergonomic insertion into a
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/// credential's `proof` array (when in-band binding is desired).
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pub fn issue_vc_jwt(
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vc: &VerifiableCredential,
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signing_key: &SigningKey,
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kid: Option<String>,
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) -> Result<(String, JwtProof), VcError> {
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let header = JwtHeader::eddsa(kid);
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let header_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&header)?;
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let payload_bytes = serde_jcs::to_vec(vc).map_err(|e| VcError::Jcs(e.to_string()))?;
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let h = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&header_bytes);
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let p = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&payload_bytes);
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let signing_input = format!("{h}.{p}");
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let sig: Signature = signing_key.sign(signing_input.as_bytes());
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let s = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig.to_bytes());
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let jwt = format!("{signing_input}.{s}");
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let proof = JwtProof {
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type_: "JwtProof2020".to_string(),
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jwt: jwt.clone(),
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};
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Ok((jwt, proof))
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}
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/// Verify a VC-JWT compact string with `verifying_key`. Returns the
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/// decoded credential on success.
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pub fn verify_vc_jwt(
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jwt: &str,
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verifying_key: &VerifyingKey,
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) -> Result<VerifiableCredential, VcError> {
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let parts: Vec<&str> = jwt.split('.').collect();
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if parts.len() != 3 {
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return Err(VcError::Jwt(format!(
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"expected 3 compact JWS parts, got {}",
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parts.len()
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)));
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}
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let header_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(parts[0])?;
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let header: JwtHeader = serde_json::from_slice(&header_bytes)?;
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if header.alg != "EdDSA" {
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return Err(VcError::Jwt(format!(
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"unsupported alg: {}",
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header.alg
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)));
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}
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let payload_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(parts[1])?;
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let sig_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(parts[2])?;
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if sig_bytes.len() != 64 {
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return Err(VcError::Jwt(format!(
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"expected 64-byte Ed25519 signature, got {}",
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sig_bytes.len()
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)));
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}
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let mut s = [0u8; 64];
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s.copy_from_slice(&sig_bytes);
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let signature = Signature::from_bytes(&s);
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let signing_input = format!("{}.{}", parts[0], parts[1]);
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verifying_key
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.verify(signing_input.as_bytes(), &signature)
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.map_err(|e| VcError::Signature(e.to_string()))?;
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let vc: VerifiableCredential = serde_json::from_slice(&payload_bytes)?;
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Ok(vc)
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use crate::credential::{CredentialSubject, VcBuilder};
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use crate::issuer::Issuer;
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use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
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use rand::rngs::OsRng;
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fn fixture_vc() -> VerifiableCredential {
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let subj = CredentialSubject {
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id: Some("did:example:alice".parse().unwrap()),
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claims: serde_json::Map::new(),
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};
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VcBuilder::new()
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.issuer(Issuer::Uri("did:example:issuer".parse().unwrap()))
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.subject(subj)
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.build()
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.unwrap()
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}
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#[test]
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fn jwt_roundtrip() {
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let sk = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
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let vk = sk.verifying_key();
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let vc = fixture_vc();
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let (jwt, _proof) = issue_vc_jwt(
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&vc,
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&sk,
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Some("did:example:issuer#keys-1".into()),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let back = verify_vc_jwt(&jwt, &vk).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(back.issuer.id().as_str(), "did:example:issuer");
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}
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#[test]
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fn jwt_rejects_wrong_key() {
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let sk = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
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let other = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
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let vc = fixture_vc();
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let (jwt, _) = issue_vc_jwt(&vc, &sk, None).unwrap();
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assert!(verify_vc_jwt(&jwt, &other.verifying_key()).is_err());
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}
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}
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