openpay/ (+3 crates, ~8400 LOC, 162 tests)
op-iso8583/ ISO 8583 messages for direct acquirer / card-network
connectivity. MTIs, primary+secondary bitmaps, full
DE catalogue, BCD/ASCII/EBCDIC/LLVAR/LLLVAR codecs,
five dialects (Visa Base I, Mastercard MDS, Amex GNS,
Discover, JCB), network-management messages
(sign-on/echo/cutover), DE 55 EMV TLV.
op-mobile-wallets/ Apple Pay (ECDH-P256 + AES-256-GCM), Google Pay ECv2
(ECDH + HKDF + AES-256-CTR + HMAC), Samsung Pay. PAN
never leaves the decryption boundary as a String;
lands in VaultRef. No-PAN-leakage assertions per
wallet.
op-routing/ Least-cost routing + MCC-aware routing + intelligent
retry / soft-decline recovery. 231-MCC catalogue.
Real ISO 8583 DE-39 soft/hard decline taxonomies.
smart-byte/smart-byte-rs/ (+3 crates, ~7100 LOC, 96 tests)
smart-byte-vc/ W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0: VCDM, presentations,
Data Integrity proofs (eddsa-jcs-2022), VC-JWT,
SD-JWT (selective disclosure), Bitstring Status
List 2021. Cargo-bridge maps VCs to Smart Byte
envelopes with SAID stability.
smart-byte-did/ W3C DID resolution: did:key (Ed25519/P-256/secp256k1),
did:web (HTTPS), did:peer (numalgo 2+4), did:jwk,
did:ion (feature-gated stub). DID URL dereferencer.
smart-byte-pq/ Post-quantum signatures: ML-DSA-44/65/87 (FIPS 204),
SLH-DSA across 12 parameter sets (FIPS 205), FN-DSA
(draft FIPS 206, feature-gated). Hybrid Ed25519 +
ML-DSA pattern for the transition. Secret-key
zeroize-on-drop.
eoc/eoc-rs/ (+3 crates, ~6450 LOC, 76 tests)
eoc-vendor-api/ NeuralBackend implementations: Anthropic, OpenAI,
Google, Mistral, Cohere, Groq, Together, Fireworks.
SSE streaming. Prompt-caching where supported.
Joule estimates per published energy coefficient
(12-model curated table).
eoc-embeddings/ 21 embedding models behind one Embedder trait:
OpenAI v3 (3), Cohere v3 (3), Voyage (5), Mistral,
Jina, plus local ONNX (BGE x3, nomic, mxbai, GTE,
E5) behind 'local' feature. Matryoshka-style
dimension projection. Per-content-hash cache.
eoc-route-learned/ RouteLLM-style matrix-factorisation router +
multinomial-logreg classifier + LinUCB / Thompson
bandits for online learning. LearnedCascade wraps
the rule-based cascade with a confidence-threshold
skip policy. Synthetic-eval accuracy: MF 0.935,
LogReg 0.980.
Quality:
- cargo check across all three workspaces: clean
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings on every new crate: clean
- 334 new tests total; all passing
- #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across every new crate
- No unwrap/expect outside #[cfg(test)]
Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 (inherited via root rust-toolchain.toml).
84 lines
3.4 KiB
Rust
84 lines
3.4 KiB
Rust
//! Common cryptogram + ECI primitives shared by all three wallets.
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//!
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//! Each wallet emits a per-transaction cryptogram bound to the DPAN and
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//! the transaction amount. The wire format differs by network (Visa
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//! TAVV, Mastercard AAV/UCAF, Amex AEVV), but the **role** is the same:
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//! the cryptogram authenticates the *use* of the network token at
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//! authorization time.
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//!
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//! We reuse [`op_rails_card::network_token::Cryptogram`] as the
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//! normalized over-the-wire shape so a decryption pipeline can feed
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//! straight into the network-token rail without re-shaping. The
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//! types below are the *wallet-side* metadata that doesn't survive
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//! into the normalized cryptogram — the ECI string and the 3DS2
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//! indicator — but which the rail driver needs to read off the
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//! decrypted token before forwarding.
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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pub use op_rails_card::network_token::Cryptogram;
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/// Electronic Commerce Indicator (ECI).
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///
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/// Wallets emit network-specific ECI values that downstream
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/// authorization logic forwards verbatim to the acquirer:
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///
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/// - Visa wallet-authenticated: `"05"`
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/// - Visa attempted-authentication: `"06"`
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/// - Mastercard wallet-authenticated: `"02"`
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/// - Mastercard attempted-authentication: `"01"`
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/// - Amex wallet-authenticated: `"05"`
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///
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/// The decryptor preserves the string the wallet emitted — we do not
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/// re-derive ECI from cryptogram material. Translation between
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/// network-specific and rail-specific ECI ranges happens at the
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/// rail driver, not here.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct EciIndicator(String);
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impl EciIndicator {
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/// Wrap a wallet-emitted ECI string.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn new(eci: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
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Self(eci.into())
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}
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/// Borrow the ECI string.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
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&self.0
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}
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/// True if this ECI corresponds to the network's "fully
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/// authenticated" code (Visa `"05"` / Mastercard `"02"` /
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/// Amex `"05"`). Used by rail drivers to assert the
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/// network-token liability-shift posture before forwarding.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn is_fully_authenticated(&self) -> bool {
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matches!(self.0.as_str(), "05" | "02")
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}
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}
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/// 3-D Secure 2 indicator extracted from the wallet payload.
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///
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/// Apple Pay sets this implicitly via the `paymentDataType` field
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/// (`"3DSecure"` vs `"EMV"`); Google Pay surfaces it as a
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/// `messageId`-adjacent field; Samsung Pay matches Apple Pay's shape.
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/// We normalize across them into a small enum so rail code branches
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/// on the type system instead of free-form strings.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum ThreeDsIndicator {
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/// The wallet has performed 3-D Secure 2 authentication for this
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/// transaction; the cryptogram includes the device-attested AAV
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/// (Mastercard) / CAVV (Visa) material.
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Authenticated,
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/// The wallet has *attempted* 3-D Secure but the issuer's ACS
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/// returned `attempts` rather than full authentication. Liability
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/// shift is still in effect on most networks; surfaced separately
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/// because some rail-side risk policies treat it differently.
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Attempted,
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/// Wallet-authenticated via EMV cryptogram path (Apple Pay
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/// `"EMV"`), not via 3-D Secure. Predominant for in-store
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/// (Tap-to-Pay) and most in-app transactions.
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EmvCryptogram,
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}
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