open-standards/sandbox/proof
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sandbox: a confidential run sealed on SEV-SNP hardware, verified by a third party
The run binding of #392 had only met software-grounded reports. This runs
the reference host inside an SEV-SNP guest and records the result as
evidence anyone can re-check offline.

sandbox-runtime examples:
- confidential_run, run inside the guest. It takes reports through
  configfs-tsm and seals an S6 run against a challenge; the report_data is
  the run binding of SPEC §7.6. It then checks the attestation through the
  chip's VCEK: verified against the challenge, refused against another and
  against none.
- verify_run: the third party's check, from the attestation, the challenge
  issued and the VCEK alone.

sandbox/proof/hardware/2026-10-21-sev-snp: the attestation (with the
1184-byte v5 report), the challenge, the chip's VCEK and AMD's cert chain,
and a README saying what it shows and what it does not. The unit is a
placeholder, so this exercises the binding and verifier on silicon, not
isolation.

Checked on our side, away from the guest:
- The VCEK was fetched from AMD's KDS by the chip id and TCB inside the
  report, and openssl verifies it to ARK-Milan.
- verify_run on the build host verifies the run, and refuses another
  challenge and no challenge.
- An attestation with its outcome changed is refused ("report-data binding
  mismatch"): the AMD signature covers the outcome through the binding.

sandbox-tee: the version comment now says what the code does (v2 layout
and later; a v5 report verified on hardware).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-21 16:25:26 -04:00
..
hardware/2026-10-21-sev-snp sandbox: a confidential run sealed on SEV-SNP hardware, verified by a third party 2026-10-21 16:25:26 -04:00
matrix.jsonl Add aac, map, sandbox standards; catalog the standards family 2026-06-07 17:04:36 -04:00
README.md Add aac, map, sandbox standards; catalog the standards family 2026-06-07 17:04:36 -04:00

The Sandbox proof matrix

The standard's claim to be a universal substrate is only worth what the proof behind it is worth. This directory holds that proof: a ledger of signed proof cells, each one a real run of the conformance pack plus a sealed workload on a real target, recording the substrate, OS, architecture, cloud, hardware classes, and tier it actually demonstrated.

A green cell is never a claim. It is an Ed25519 signature (over the cell's JCS-canonical form — the family attestation primitive) that references an attestation and receipt which themselves verify. What a host cannot prove — no /dev/kvm → no microVM tier, no configfs-tsm → no confidential tier — is recorded as unavailable, never faked. Run the harness on more targets and the matrix fills with real proofs.

The matrix axes

substrate : Wasm · Container · MicroVm · Tee · BareMetal · Browser
OS        : linux · macos · windows
arch      : x86_64 · aarch64 · riscv64
cloud     : local · aws · azure · gcp · alibaba · cloudflare · fly · …
hardware  : Cpu · Simd · Gpu · Npu · Tpu · Lpu · Photonic · Quantum
tier      : S0 … S7

A cell is one point in {substrate × OS × arch × cloud × hardware × tier}. matrix.jsonl accumulates the cells that have been proved.

Producing and checking proofs

The harness is sandbox-proof:

cd ../sandbox-rs
# Prove THIS host — runs the conformance pack + a sealed S2 (WASM) run,
# probes which higher substrates are available, and appends a signed cell.
SANDBOX_CLOUD=local cargo run -p sandbox-proof -- prove ../proof/matrix.jsonl

# Re-verify every cell's signature (CI-friendly exit code).
cargo run -p sandbox-proof -- verify ../proof/matrix.jsonl

# Render the proved cells.
cargo run -p sandbox-proof -- show ../proof/matrix.jsonl

Set SANDBOX_CLOUD to the cloud/region the host runs in (e.g. aws, gcp), and SANDBOX_PROOF_KEY (64 hex) to the operator's own signing key; a fixed dev key is used otherwise.

What a cell records

Each line of matrix.jsonl is a SignedProofCell: the substrate/OS/arch/cloud/hardware/tier proved, the per-class conformance outcome, the content addresses of the run's attestation and energy receipt, the substrates the host reported available, a timestamp, and the Ed25519 signature + public key. Anyone can re-verify a cell without trusting the operator who produced it.

Honesty

The harness proves what the host can actually demonstrate. Today the universal cell is Wasm / S2, which runs anywhere the reference runtime does (Linux, macOS, Windows, any arch — and in a browser via WASM). Higher tiers (microVM, confidential) light up only on hosts that genuinely provide them. The matrix grows by running on more substrates, clouds, and accelerators — never by asserting a cell that wasn't run.