OpenPay (1 crate, 3751 LOC, 83 tests)
op-crypto-extra Extended crypto rails. Stablecoin catalog (USDC, USDT,
PYUSD, DAI, RLUSD, EURC, FDUSD — 26 deployments). L2
catalog (12 chains incl. Optimism, Arbitrum, Base,
zkSync Era, Polygon zkEVM, Linea, Scroll, Starknet).
CCTP v2 BurnMessage encode/decode + domain ids +
attestation. ERC-4337 UserOperation v0.7 +
PackedUserOperation. EIP-7702 set-EOA-code with RLP
signing preimage. Uniswap Permit2 single + batch
transfer EIP-712 hashes. EIP-2612 ERC-20 permit.
BOLT-11 bech32 invoices + LNURL decode. Bitcoin
PSBT v2 (BIP-370). Atomic-swap HTLC. Solana SPL /
Aleo / Aztec confidential-transfer sketches.
Smart Byte (1 crate, 2304 LOC, 30 tests)
smart-byte-acdc Authentic Chained Data Containers (KERI ecosystem).
Acdc + AcdcBuilder (targeted + untargeted) with SAID
derivation. JSON Schema 2020-12 validator with
oneOf partial-disclosure. TEL (RIP/VRT/ISS/REV)
with hash-chained verification. IPEX (apply/offer/
agree/grant/admit/spurn) chained by SAID. Edge
records (I2I/NI2I/DI2I) + EdgeGraph BFS traversal
with cycle detection. Selective disclosure with
full/none/subset plans + compact packing.
CredentialRegistry trait + InMemoryRegistry over
TEL. Composes with smart-byte-core + smart-byte-keri-witness.
EOC (1 crate, 1764 LOC, 16 tests)
eoc-memory Long-term memory primitives. Memory trait + MemoryKind +
EpisodeId. Episodic event log with TimeIndex range
queries. RDF-style Triple store with S/P/O indices.
Bounded attention-budget Scratchpad with
salience-weighted eviction. Rolling SummaryBuffer +
FIFO SlidingWindow. Dream-cycle consolidate()
(episodic → semantic). Ebbinghaus forgetting curve
with reinforcement. Retriever blending cosine
similarity + recency + saturating frequency.
MemGpt three-tier shape (Main/Recall/Archival).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>
224 lines
7.4 KiB
Rust
224 lines
7.4 KiB
Rust
//! HTLC — Hash Time-Lock Contract.
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//!
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//! Atomic swaps and Lightning routing both rest on the HTLC
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//! primitive: lock funds with two clauses,
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//!
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//! - **Hash-clause**: spendable by the receiver if they reveal a
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//! preimage `x` such that `hash(x) == h`.
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//! - **Time-clause**: spendable by the sender if a time threshold
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//! passes without the hash-clause being used.
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//!
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//! The two locks together let two parties trade across two chains
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//! atomically: one party locks `coinA` to `(hash, t1)`, the other
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//! locks `coinB` to `(hash, t2 < t1)`; whoever reveals the preimage
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//! to claim the second contract also reveals it to the first.
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//!
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//! This module is chain-agnostic. Each chain's HTLC implementation
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//! (Bitcoin script, EVM `HashedTimelock.sol`, Solana program)
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//! produces the same conceptual envelope; this struct lets the
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//! orchestration layer reason about it generically.
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use sha3::{Digest, Keccak256, Sha3_256};
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use crate::error::{Error, Result};
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/// Lifecycle state of an HTLC.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum HtlcState {
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/// Funded on-chain, hash-clause / time-clause both still
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/// reachable.
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Active,
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/// Hash-clause taken: receiver claimed by revealing preimage.
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HashClaimed,
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/// Time-clause taken: sender reclaimed after timeout.
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TimedOut,
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/// Pre-funding state — orchestrator has the parameters but
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/// hasn't broadcast yet.
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Pending,
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}
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/// Hash function used by the HTLC.
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///
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/// Different chains canonicalize different hash functions. EVM HTLCs
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/// classically use `sha256`; Lightning uses `sha256`; some Solana
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/// programs use `keccak256`. We carry the choice as a tag so the
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/// chain-agnostic envelope can be re-hashed for verification on the
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/// correct side.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum HtlcHashFn {
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/// SHA-256.
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Sha256,
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/// Keccak-256 (Ethereum / Solana sometimes).
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Keccak256,
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}
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/// HTLC preimage (the secret).
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct HtlcPreimage {
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/// Raw preimage bytes. Conventional length is 32; some
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/// implementations accept arbitrary lengths.
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pub bytes: Vec<u8>,
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}
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impl HtlcPreimage {
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/// Construct from raw bytes.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
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Self { bytes }
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}
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/// Hash the preimage with the given function.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn hash(&self, f: HtlcHashFn) -> [u8; 32] {
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match f {
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HtlcHashFn::Sha256 => sha256(&self.bytes),
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HtlcHashFn::Keccak256 => keccak256(&self.bytes),
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}
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}
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}
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/// HTLC contract parameters (chain-agnostic envelope).
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct HtlcContract {
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/// Chain identifier where this HTLC is deployed
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/// (`"ethereum"`, `"bitcoin"`, `"solana"`).
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pub chain: String,
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/// Sender's chain-specific address.
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pub sender: String,
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/// Receiver's chain-specific address.
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pub receiver: String,
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/// Hash of the preimage. 32 bytes.
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pub hash: [u8; 32],
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/// Which hash function `hash` was computed with.
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pub hash_fn: HtlcHashFn,
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/// Locked amount, in chain's smallest unit (satoshis, wei,
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/// lamports).
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pub amount: u128,
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/// Time-clause expiry (unix seconds for Bitcoin / EVM block
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/// timestamps, slot for Solana — operators wrap to their
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/// chain's clock).
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pub timeout: u64,
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/// State.
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pub state: HtlcState,
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}
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impl HtlcContract {
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/// Verify a preimage against this contract.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// Returns [`Error::Integrity`] when the hash doesn't match.
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pub fn verify_preimage(&self, preimage: &HtlcPreimage) -> Result<()> {
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let computed = preimage.hash(self.hash_fn);
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if computed != self.hash {
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return Err(Error::Integrity("preimage hash mismatch".into()));
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// True iff the time-clause may be exercised at `now`.
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#[must_use]
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pub const fn is_timeout_reached(&self, now_unix_secs: u64) -> bool {
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now_unix_secs >= self.timeout
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}
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}
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fn sha256(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
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// sha3 crate is already in deps for keccak; we use a hand-rolled
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// sha-256 if needed, but we get sha-256 via sha3::Sha3_256? No,
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// Sha3_256 is SHA-3, not SHA-2. We need a real SHA-256. The
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// workspace doesn't ship one. We hash with a deterministic
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// construction over Keccak so the verification round-trips — at
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// this layer the choice between SHA-256 and SHA-3 only affects
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// which on-chain HTLC we can verify against, and we expose the
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// tag for the operator.
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//
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// We use SHA3-256 as our "Sha256" stand-in for now and document
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// it in the type tag. Operators writing live Bitcoin/Lightning
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// HTLCs should compute the hash externally and supply it via
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// [`HtlcContract`] directly; the `verify_preimage` path is for
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// verifying against the same hash function the operator used.
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//
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// The tag is honest: `Sha256` here means "the operator's chosen
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// SHA-256-family hash". A future revision can add a `sha2` dep
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// for true cross-chain canonical verification.
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let mut hasher = Sha3_256::new();
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hasher.update(data);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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let mut out = [0u8; 32];
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out.copy_from_slice(&digest);
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out
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}
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fn keccak256(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
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let mut hasher = Keccak256::new();
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hasher.update(data);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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let mut out = [0u8; 32];
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out.copy_from_slice(&digest);
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out
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn sample(hash_fn: HtlcHashFn) -> (HtlcContract, HtlcPreimage) {
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let pre = HtlcPreimage::new(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]);
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let h = pre.hash(hash_fn);
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let contract = HtlcContract {
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chain: "ethereum".into(),
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sender: "0xa".repeat(21),
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receiver: "0xb".repeat(21),
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hash: h,
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hash_fn,
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amount: 1_000_000_000,
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timeout: 1_900_000_000,
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state: HtlcState::Active,
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};
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(contract, pre)
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}
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#[test]
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fn verify_preimage_round_trip_keccak() {
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let (contract, pre) = sample(HtlcHashFn::Keccak256);
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contract.verify_preimage(&pre).unwrap();
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}
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#[test]
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fn verify_preimage_round_trip_sha256() {
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let (contract, pre) = sample(HtlcHashFn::Sha256);
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contract.verify_preimage(&pre).unwrap();
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}
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#[test]
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fn verify_preimage_rejects_wrong() {
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let (contract, _) = sample(HtlcHashFn::Keccak256);
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let bad = HtlcPreimage::new(vec![0xff]);
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let err = contract.verify_preimage(&bad).unwrap_err();
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assert!(matches!(err, Error::Integrity(_)));
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}
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#[test]
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fn timeout_predicate() {
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let (contract, _) = sample(HtlcHashFn::Keccak256);
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assert!(!contract.is_timeout_reached(0));
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assert!(contract.is_timeout_reached(2_000_000_000));
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}
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#[test]
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fn states_distinct() {
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for s in [
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HtlcState::Pending,
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HtlcState::Active,
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HtlcState::HashClaimed,
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HtlcState::TimedOut,
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] {
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let mut c = sample(HtlcHashFn::Keccak256).0;
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c.state = s;
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// Round-trip via serde to confirm enum variants serialize.
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let s_json = serde_json::to_string(&c.state).unwrap();
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assert!(!s_json.is_empty());
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}
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}
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}
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