cb793b61da
joule-moq reads a rating claim as wai-rs does (strict JSON, exactly its members, JCS, Ed25519 under WAI's strict rule), writes one, and agrees with the age corpus on every claim and every serving request. A grant head reads its age attribute (§5.4). The relay takes claims from PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE_OK track properties and from object properties, holds what §3.6 lets it honour, bounded per room and track and in all, and serves each session by its proven grants' threshold: a live object of a group above it is not forwarded, the streams of groups a newly held claim raises are ended, and a SUBSCRIBE, FETCH or fill is refused below_threshold at its start or answered up to the first refused group. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
428 lines
20 KiB
Rust
428 lines
20 KiB
Rust
//! Authorization tokens: the alias cache a receiver keeps for each session
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//! (`draft-ietf-moq-transport-22` §8.9, §9.1.3, §9.1.4), and the relay's grants.
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//!
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//! A grant names a namespace prefix, the rights it gives (publish, subscribe), and the
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//! SHA-256 of the token value that carries it. Tokens are of type 0, agreed out of band
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//! (§8.9: "Type 0 is reserved to indicate that the type is not defined in the table and
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//! is negotiated out-of-band"). A grant rule with `proof` names a room grant's record,
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//! which every participant of the room holds: it gives its rights only on a session whose
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//! SETUP proved possession of the grant's principal's key (WAI live-rooms §10.5).
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//!
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//! A relay that serves a room whose authority issues grants as visitors arrive cannot name
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//! each in advance: it is given the authority's key instead, and honours every grant that
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//! key signed, mapped onto rights as live-rooms §10.2 maps it, beside its proof and within
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//! its window. A field `*` in a rule's prefix matches any one field.
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use crate::config::AuthConfig;
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use joule_moq::draft22::{SessionError, Token};
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use joule_moq::grant_proof::GrantHead;
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use joule_moq::TrackNamespace;
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use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
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/// A token's size against MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_SIZE: 16 bytes and its value (§9.1.3).
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fn size_of(value: &[u8]) -> u64 {
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16 + value.len() as u64
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}
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/// One token as a message resolves it: its type and value.
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pub type Resolved = (u64, Vec<u8>);
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/// The aliases one peer has registered with this endpoint.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct TokenCache {
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max: u64,
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used: u64,
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entries: HashMap<u64, Resolved>,
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}
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impl TokenCache {
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/// A cache bounded by the MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_SIZE this endpoint declared.
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pub fn new(max: u64) -> Self {
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TokenCache { max, used: 0, entries: HashMap::new() }
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}
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pub fn used(&self) -> u64 {
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self.used
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}
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/// The tokens of the peer's SETUP. A REGISTER past the limit is read as USE_VALUE,
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/// never a failure (§9.1.4); a duplicate alias still closes the session. A client's
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/// SETUP carries no DELETE or USE_ALIAS (`Setup::check_from` refuses them first).
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pub fn setup(&mut self, tokens: &[Token]) -> Result<Vec<Resolved>, SessionError> {
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let mut out = Vec::new();
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for t in tokens {
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match t {
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Token::Register { alias, token_type, value } => {
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if self.entries.contains_key(alias) {
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return Err(SessionError::DUPLICATE_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS);
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}
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if self.used + size_of(value) <= self.max {
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self.used += size_of(value);
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self.entries.insert(*alias, (*token_type, value.clone()));
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}
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out.push((*token_type, value.clone()));
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}
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Token::UseValue { token_type, value } => out.push((*token_type, value.clone())),
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Token::Delete { .. } | Token::UseAlias { .. } => return Err(SessionError::PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
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}
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}
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Ok(out)
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}
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/// The tokens of one request: registered, retired or resolved. A REGISTER that would
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/// pass the limit closes the session with AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_OVERFLOW, and a duplicate
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/// alias with DUPLICATE_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS; a reference to an alias not registered is
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/// UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS (§8.9). A REGISTER is kept even when the request it rides
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/// fails for another reason.
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pub fn resolve(&mut self, tokens: &[Token]) -> Result<Vec<Resolved>, SessionError> {
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let mut out = Vec::new();
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for t in tokens {
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match t {
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Token::Register { alias, token_type, value } => {
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if self.entries.contains_key(alias) {
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return Err(SessionError::DUPLICATE_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS);
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}
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if self.used + size_of(value) > self.max {
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return Err(SessionError::AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_OVERFLOW);
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}
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self.used += size_of(value);
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self.entries.insert(*alias, (*token_type, value.clone()));
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out.push((*token_type, value.clone()));
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}
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Token::Delete { alias } => match self.entries.remove(alias) {
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Some((_, v)) => self.used -= size_of(&v),
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None => return Err(SessionError::UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS),
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},
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Token::UseAlias { alias } => match self.entries.get(alias) {
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Some(r) => out.push(r.clone()),
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None => return Err(SessionError::UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS),
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},
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Token::UseValue { token_type, value } => out.push((*token_type, value.clone())),
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}
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}
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Ok(out)
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}
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}
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/// What a request asks to do.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum Right {
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Publish,
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Subscribe,
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}
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struct GrantRule {
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prefix: TrackNamespace,
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token_sha256: [u8; 32],
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publish: bool,
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subscribe: bool,
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proof: bool,
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unlimited: bool,
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seek: bool,
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}
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struct AuthorityRule {
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key: [u8; 32],
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/// Empty: every room the authority grants.
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rooms: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
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}
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/// The relay's grants.
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pub struct Authorizer {
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required: bool,
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grants: Vec<GrantRule>,
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authorities: Vec<AuthorityRule>,
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}
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pub fn sha256(b: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
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crate::cert::sha256(b)
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}
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/// Whether `prefix` matches the first fields of `ns` (MOQT §2.4.2), a field `*` of
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/// `prefix` matching any one field.
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pub fn pattern_matches(prefix: &TrackNamespace, ns: &TrackNamespace) -> bool {
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prefix.0.len() <= ns.0.len() && prefix.0.iter().zip(&ns.0).all(|(p, n)| p.as_slice() == b"*" || p == n)
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}
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fn key32(what: &str, h: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], String> {
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hex::decode(h).map_err(|e| format!("{what}: {e}"))?.try_into().map_err(|_| format!("{what} is not 32 bytes"))
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}
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fn unix_s() -> u64 {
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std::time::SystemTime::now().duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH).map_or(0, |d| d.as_secs())
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}
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/// Whether a room grant's head gives `right` over `ns` (WAI live-rooms §10.2, with the
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/// room id `R` and the principal `P` as 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits): PUBLISH under
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/// `[R, P, m]` for each media kind `m` it may publish, of `[R, P]` (its catalog track)
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/// when it may publish any, and under `[R, P, events]` when its policy permits any event
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/// kind; SUBSCRIBE and FETCH under `[R]` when it may subscribe. The relay's rights are per
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/// namespace, so §10.2's track matches (the layers up to `max_layer`) are not narrowed
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/// here.
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pub fn room_grant_allows(g: &GrantHead, ns: &TrackNamespace, right: Right) -> bool {
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let r = hex::encode(g.room).into_bytes();
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let f = &ns.0;
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if f.first() != Some(&r) {
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return false;
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}
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match right {
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Right::Subscribe => g.subscribe,
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Right::Publish => {
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if f.len() < 2 || f[1] != hex::encode(g.principal).into_bytes() {
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return false;
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}
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match f.get(2).map(Vec::as_slice) {
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None => g.publish & 0b111 != 0,
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Some(b"events") => g.sends_events,
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Some(b"audio") => g.publishes(1),
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Some(b"video") => g.publishes(2),
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Some(b"screen") => g.publishes(3),
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Some(_) => false,
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}
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}
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}
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}
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impl Authorizer {
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pub fn from_config(c: &AuthConfig) -> Result<Self, String> {
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let mut grants = Vec::new();
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for g in &c.grants {
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let h = key32("a grant's token_sha256", &g.token_sha256)?;
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grants.push(GrantRule { prefix: TrackNamespace::from_strs(g.prefix.iter().map(String::as_str)), token_sha256: h, publish: g.publish, subscribe: g.subscribe, proof: g.proof, unlimited: g.unlimited, seek: g.seek });
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}
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let mut authorities = Vec::new();
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for a in &c.authorities {
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let key = key32("an authority's key", &a.key)?;
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ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&key).map_err(|e| format!("an authority's key: {e}"))?;
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let rooms = a.rooms.iter().map(|r| key32("an authority's room", r)).collect::<Result<_, _>>()?;
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authorities.push(AuthorityRule { key, rooms });
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}
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Ok(Authorizer { required: c.required, grants, authorities })
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}
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pub fn open() -> Self {
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Authorizer { required: false, grants: Vec::new(), authorities: Vec::new() }
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}
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/// The head of `value` when it is a room grant one of the configured authorities
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/// signed, for a room that authority is honoured for.
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pub fn authority_grant(&self, value: &[u8]) -> Option<GrantHead> {
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if self.authorities.is_empty() {
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return None;
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}
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self.authorities.iter().find_map(|a| GrantHead::verified(value, &a.key).filter(|g| a.rooms.is_empty() || a.rooms.contains(&g.room)))
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}
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/// Whether `tokens` (the request's, and the session's from SETUP) give `right` over
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/// `ns`. A rule with `proof` counts only for a token whose SHA-256 `proven` holds: one
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/// the session's SETUP proved possession of. An authority's grant counts only when
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/// proven, and only within its window.
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pub fn allows(&self, ns: &TrackNamespace, right: Right, tokens: &[Resolved], proven: &HashSet<[u8; 32]>) -> bool {
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if !self.required {
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return true;
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}
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let now = unix_s();
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tokens.iter().any(|(ty, value)| {
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if *ty != 0 {
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return false;
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}
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let h = sha256(value);
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let by_rule = self.grants.iter().any(|g| {
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g.token_sha256 == h
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&& (!g.proof || proven.contains(&h))
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&& pattern_matches(&g.prefix, ns)
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&& match right {
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Right::Publish => g.publish,
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Right::Subscribe => g.subscribe,
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}
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});
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by_rule || (proven.contains(&h) && self.authority_grant(value).is_some_and(|g| g.good_at(now) && room_grant_allows(&g, ns, right)))
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})
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}
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/// Whether `tokens` may seek back on a track under `ns`: fetch it, or fill it, from
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/// below its live edge (WAI live-rooms §10.6). With no authorization required, every
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/// session may. Otherwise a token whose rule gives subscribe and `seek` over `ns`, or an
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/// authority's grant, proved and within its window, that gives the track to subscribe
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/// (§10.2) and whose powers hold seek (§3.3, bit 4).
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pub fn may_seek(&self, ns: &TrackNamespace, tokens: &[Resolved], proven: &HashSet<[u8; 32]>) -> bool {
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if !self.required {
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return true;
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}
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let now = unix_s();
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tokens.iter().any(|(ty, value)| {
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if *ty != 0 {
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return false;
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}
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let h = sha256(value);
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let by_rule = self.grants.iter().any(|g| g.token_sha256 == h && (!g.proof || proven.contains(&h)) && pattern_matches(&g.prefix, ns) && g.subscribe && g.seek);
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by_rule || (proven.contains(&h) && self.authority_grant(value).is_some_and(|g| g.good_at(now) && g.seeks() && room_grant_allows(&g, ns, Right::Subscribe)))
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})
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}
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/// The heads of the authority-signed grants among `tokens` the session proved: whose
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/// powers a relay reads (a moderator's, WAI live-rooms §3.3).
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pub fn proven_grants(&self, tokens: &[Resolved], proven: &HashSet<[u8; 32]>) -> Vec<GrantHead> {
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tokens.iter().filter(|(ty, v)| *ty == 0 && proven.contains(&sha256(v))).filter_map(|(_, v)| self.authority_grant(v)).collect()
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}
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/// Whether `signer` is a room key of `room` (WAI live-rooms §2): an authority the relay is
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/// configured to honour for that room. A rating claim it signs about the room or a track
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/// of it is the room's (age-assurance §3.6).
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pub fn is_room_key(&self, signer: &[u8; 32], room: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
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self.authorities.iter().any(|a| a.key == *signer && (a.rooms.is_empty() || a.rooms.contains(room)))
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}
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/// The keys of the configured room authorities.
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pub fn authority_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 32]> {
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self.authorities.iter().map(|a| a.key).collect()
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}
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/// Whether the session's SETUP tokens name a rule that exempts it from the session and
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/// ingress limits.
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pub fn unlimited(&self, tokens: &[Resolved], proven: &HashSet<[u8; 32]>) -> bool {
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tokens.iter().any(|(ty, value)| {
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let h = sha256(value);
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*ty == 0 && self.grants.iter().any(|g| g.unlimited && g.token_sha256 == h && (!g.proof || proven.contains(&h)))
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})
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}
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/// Whether a token of type 0 with this value is a room grant honoured only beside a
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/// proof of possession: one a `proof` rule names, or one a configured authority signed.
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pub fn requires_proof(&self, value: &[u8]) -> bool {
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let h = sha256(value);
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self.required && (self.grants.iter().any(|g| g.proof && g.token_sha256 == h) || self.authority_grant(value).is_some())
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn the_cache_follows_section_8_9() {
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let mut c = TokenCache::new(16 + 4 + 16 + 3);
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let reg = |a, v: &[u8]| Token::Register { alias: a, token_type: 0, value: v.to_vec() };
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[reg(1, b"abcd")]).unwrap(), vec![(0, b"abcd".to_vec())]);
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[reg(1, b"x")]), Err(SessionError::DUPLICATE_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS));
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[reg(2, b"wxyz")]), Err(SessionError::AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_OVERFLOW));
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[reg(2, b"xyz")]).unwrap().len(), 1);
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[Token::UseAlias { alias: 1 }]).unwrap(), vec![(0, b"abcd".to_vec())]);
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[Token::UseAlias { alias: 9 }]), Err(SessionError::UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS));
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c.resolve(&[Token::Delete { alias: 1 }]).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(c.used(), 16 + 3);
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assert_eq!(c.resolve(&[Token::Delete { alias: 1 }]), Err(SessionError::UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS));
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// In SETUP a registration past the limit reads as USE_VALUE.
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let mut s = TokenCache::new(0);
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assert_eq!(s.setup(&[reg(5, b"big")]).unwrap(), vec![(0, b"big".to_vec())]);
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assert_eq!(s.resolve(&[Token::UseAlias { alias: 5 }]), Err(SessionError::UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS));
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}
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#[test]
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fn grants_cover_a_prefix_and_a_right() {
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let cfg = AuthConfig {
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required: true,
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authorities: vec![],
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grants: vec![
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crate::config::Grant { prefix: vec!["live".into()], token_sha256: hex::encode(sha256(b"t")), publish: false, subscribe: true, proof: false, unlimited: true, seek: false },
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crate::config::Grant { prefix: vec!["live".into()], token_sha256: hex::encode(sha256(b"g")), publish: true, subscribe: false, proof: true, unlimited: false, seek: false },
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],
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};
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let a = Authorizer::from_config(&cfg).unwrap();
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let ns = TrackNamespace::from_strs(["live", "a"]);
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let none = HashSet::new();
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assert!(a.allows(&ns, Right::Subscribe, &[(0, b"t".to_vec())], &none));
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assert!(!a.allows(&ns, Right::Publish, &[(0, b"t".to_vec())], &none));
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assert!(!a.allows(&ns, Right::Subscribe, &[(0, b"u".to_vec())], &none));
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assert!(!a.allows(&TrackNamespace::from_strs(["other"]), Right::Subscribe, &[(0, b"t".to_vec())], &none));
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assert!(Authorizer::open().allows(&ns, Right::Publish, &[], &none));
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// A grant whose rule asks for a proof gives nothing until its session proved it.
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assert!(a.requires_proof(b"g") && !a.requires_proof(b"t"));
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assert!(!a.allows(&ns, Right::Publish, &[(0, b"g".to_vec())], &none));
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assert!(a.allows(&ns, Right::Publish, &[(0, b"g".to_vec())], &HashSet::from([sha256(b"g")])));
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// Exempt from the limits: a session presenting the token whose rule says so.
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assert!(a.unlimited(&[(0, b"t".to_vec())], &none) && !a.unlimited(&[(0, b"g".to_vec())], &none) && !a.unlimited(&[(0, b"u".to_vec())], &none));
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}
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/// A grant laid out as WAI live-rooms §4.1 lays it out, signed by `authority`.
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pub(crate) fn grant(authority: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, room: [u8; 32], principal: [u8; 32], nbf: u64, exp: u64, publish: u8, kinds: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
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use ed25519_dalek::Signer;
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let mut g = b"WRG1\x01".to_vec();
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g.extend_from_slice(&room);
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g.extend_from_slice(&principal);
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0; 40]); // prev, effective
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g.extend_from_slice(&nbf.to_le_bytes());
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g.extend_from_slice(&exp.to_le_bytes());
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0, publish, 1, 0, 0, 0]);
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0; 32]);
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g.extend_from_slice(b"WEP1\x01");
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let mut k = [0u8; 32];
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if kinds {
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k[0] = 1 << 3;
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}
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g.extend_from_slice(&k);
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0; 28]);
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0xff; 16]);
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0; 3]);
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g.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0]);
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let mut m = joule_moq::grant_proof::GRANT_DOMAIN.to_vec();
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m.extend_from_slice(&g);
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g.extend_from_slice(&authority.sign(&m).to_bytes());
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g
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}
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#[test]
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fn a_field_star_matches_any_field() {
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let p = TrackNamespace::from_strs(["*", "k"]);
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assert!(pattern_matches(&p, &TrackNamespace::from_strs(["r1", "k", "events"])));
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assert!(pattern_matches(&p, &TrackNamespace::from_strs(["r2", "k"])));
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assert!(!pattern_matches(&p, &TrackNamespace::from_strs(["r1", "j"])));
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assert!(!pattern_matches(&p, &TrackNamespace::from_strs(["r1"])));
|
|
assert!(pattern_matches(&TrackNamespace::from_strs(Vec::<&str>::new()), &TrackNamespace::from_strs(["any"])));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn an_authoritys_grant_maps_onto_rights_beside_its_proof() {
|
|
let authority = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7; 32]);
|
|
let stranger = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[8; 32]);
|
|
let (room, p) = ([0x11; 32], [0x22; 32]);
|
|
let cfg = |rooms: Vec<String>| AuthConfig {
|
|
required: true,
|
|
grants: vec![],
|
|
authorities: vec![crate::config::Authority { key: hex::encode(authority.verifying_key().to_bytes()), rooms }],
|
|
};
|
|
let a = Authorizer::from_config(&cfg(vec![])).unwrap();
|
|
let now = unix_s();
|
|
let g = grant(&authority, room, p, now - 60, now + 600, 0b011, true);
|
|
let tok = vec![(0u64, g.clone())];
|
|
let proven = HashSet::from([sha256(&g)]);
|
|
let (r, ph) = (hex::encode(room), hex::encode(p));
|
|
let ns = |f: &[&str]| TrackNamespace::from_strs(f.iter().copied());
|
|
assert!(a.requires_proof(&g));
|
|
// Without its proof, nothing.
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&r, &ph, "video"]), Right::Publish, &tok, &HashSet::new()));
|
|
// With it: its own media, catalog and events; every track of the room to subscribe.
|
|
for f in [vec![r.as_str(), ph.as_str(), "video"], vec![&r, &ph, "audio"], vec![&r, &ph], vec![&r, &ph, "events"]] {
|
|
assert!(a.allows(&ns(&f), Right::Publish, &tok, &proven), "{f:?}");
|
|
}
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&r, &ph, "screen"]), Right::Publish, &tok, &proven));
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&r, &"33".repeat(32), "video"]), Right::Publish, &tok, &proven), "another principal's");
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&"44".repeat(32), &ph, "video"]), Right::Publish, &tok, &proven), "another room");
|
|
assert!(a.allows(&ns(&[&r, &"33".repeat(32), "video"]), Right::Subscribe, &tok, &proven));
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&"44".repeat(32)]), Right::Subscribe, &tok, &proven));
|
|
// Outside its window, signed by another key, or for a room the rule does not name.
|
|
let old = grant(&authority, room, p, now - 600, now - 60, 0b011, true);
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&r]), Right::Subscribe, &[(0, old.clone())], &HashSet::from([sha256(&old)])));
|
|
let forged = grant(&stranger, room, p, now - 60, now + 600, 0b011, true);
|
|
assert!(!a.requires_proof(&forged));
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&r]), Right::Subscribe, &[(0, forged.clone())], &HashSet::from([sha256(&forged)])));
|
|
let narrow = Authorizer::from_config(&cfg(vec!["55".repeat(32)])).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(!narrow.allows(&ns(&[&r]), Right::Subscribe, &tok, &proven) && !narrow.requires_proof(&g));
|
|
// A viewer's grant: no media, no catalog, no events; the room to subscribe.
|
|
let v = grant(&authority, room, p, now - 60, now + 600, 0, false);
|
|
let vt = vec![(0u64, v.clone())];
|
|
let vp = HashSet::from([sha256(&v)]);
|
|
assert!(!a.allows(&ns(&[&r, &ph]), Right::Publish, &vt, &vp) && !a.allows(&ns(&[&r, &ph, "events"]), Right::Publish, &vt, &vp));
|
|
assert!(a.allows(&ns(&[&r]), Right::Subscribe, &vt, &vp));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|