openpay/ (+3 crates)
op-bnpl/ Affirm + Klarna + Afterpay/Clearpay rails. Full lifecycle
typestate (Initiated→Approved→Captured→Settled→Refunded).
Per-provider sandbox+production base URLs, regions (NA/EU/OC
for Klarna; US/AuNz/Gb/Ca/Eu for Afterpay). HMAC-SHA256
webhook verification with constant-time compare. 61 tests.
op-batch/ NACHA ACH (94-char records, PPD/CCD/WEB/TEL/CTX, R01-R99
return codes, Same-Day ACH cutoffs); SEPA pain.001.001.09
(CT) + pain.008.001.08 (DD) with SCT-Inst flagging; Fedwire
MT103/MT202/CHIPS + pacs.008.001.12 / pacs.009.001.10 +
UETR; Bacs Standard 18. Per-rail cutoff scheduler. Exception
taxonomy unified across rails. 51 tests.
op-screening/ OFAC SDN + EU consolidated + UN consolidated + HMT UK
consolidated + Australia DFAT + Canada SEMA + Japan MOF.
Levenshtein + Jaro-Winkler + Soundex + Metaphone + token
Jaccard scoring. Unicode NFKD normalisation + Cyrillic /
Arabic transliteration. Ed25519-signed BLAKE3-chained
audit log. BSA helpers: CTR + SAR pattern detection
(structuring, round-dollar, rapid-in-out). 43 tests.
smart-byte/smart-byte-rs/ (+3 crates)
smart-byte-bbs/ BBS+ signatures (IETF draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-08).
BLS12-381 keys, signatures, disclosure proofs with
cryptographic unlinkability. bbs-2023 Data Integrity
cryptosuite. AnonCreds-shaped link secrets +
predicate proofs. SecretKey zeroize-on-drop. 49 tests.
smart-byte-didcomm/ DIDComm v2 messaging per DIF spec. Pack-encrypted
(ECDH-1PU + ECDH-ES via X25519), pack-signed (JWS),
pack-plaintext. Aries protocols: issue-credential v3,
present-proof v3, basic-message, trust-ping, discover-
features, out-of-band, coordinate-mediation, message-
pickup. Mediator role with pluggable storage. 23 tests.
smart-byte-mdl/ ISO/IEC 18013-5 mobile driver's licence + 18013-7
online presentment. mDoc + MSO with salted-hash
selective disclosure (per item; SHA-256 digest tree).
org.iso.18013.5.1 namespace + AAMVA add-on. ES256
device-auth + issuer-auth. QR-code device-engagement
scaffolding. 28 tests.
eoc/eoc-rs/ (+3 crates)
eoc-local/ Local-inference backends behind one NeuralBackend:
llama.cpp (GGUF, Q4/Q5/Q6/Q8/F16/F32 quantisation),
MLX (Apple Silicon, feature-gated), MLC-LLM (TVM, feature-
gated marker), ONNX Runtime. GGUF file-format reader.
HuggingFace tokenizers. Greedy / top-k / top-p / temperature /
Mirostat samplers. Model registry scanning ~/.eoc/models/.
Joule attribution via eoc-meter. 39 tests.
eoc-rerank/ BM25 sparse + HNSW dense + RRF + min-max hybrid fusion.
Cohere v3.5 + Voyage v2 + bge-reranker v2-m3 + ms-marco
MiniLM + ColBERT v2 rerankers. Two-stage pipeline:
retrieve top-K hybrid → cross-encoder rerank → top-N.
KV-stage recovery shim into the cascade. 31 tests.
eoc-eval/ 15 canonical eval harnesses: MMLU, MMLU-Pro, GPQA,
HumanEval (pass@1 with python3 sandbox), BBH, IFEval (25
verifiable constraints), AlpacaEval, AGIEval, HellaSwag,
ARC (Easy + Challenge), TruthfulQA (MC1+MC2), BoolQ,
GSM8K, MATH (boxed-answer equivalence), Winogrande. Real
questions in BuiltinSamples. EvalRunner emits joules-per-
correct alongside accuracy. 49 tests.
Quality:
- cargo check across all three workspaces: clean
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings on every new crate: clean
- 374 new tests, all passing
- #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across every new crate
- No unwrap/expect outside #[cfg(test)]
Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 (inherited via root rust-toolchain.toml).
366 lines
12 KiB
Rust
366 lines
12 KiB
Rust
//! Inbound webhook verification + event types.
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//!
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//! All three providers sign outbound webhooks with HMAC-SHA256 over
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//! the raw request body. The signing key is provisioned by the
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//! merchant per-provider:
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//!
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//! | Provider | Header name | Encoding |
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//! |----------------------|------------------------------------------|----------|
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//! | Affirm | `X-Affirm-Signature` | base64 |
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//! | Klarna | `Klarna-Signature` | base64 |
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//! | Afterpay / Clearpay | `Afterpay-Signature` / `Clearpay-Signature` | hex |
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//!
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//! We expose three verification helpers plus a unified [`BnplEvent`]
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//! deserialiser. Verification is constant-time via `subtle::ConstantTimeEq`.
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use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64};
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use sha2::Sha256;
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use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
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use crate::error::{Error, Result};
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type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
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/// Which provider this event came from.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum WebhookProvider {
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/// Affirm.
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Affirm,
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/// Klarna.
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Klarna,
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/// Afterpay or Clearpay.
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AfterpayClearpay,
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}
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/// Normalised event kind across providers. Each provider emits its
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/// own native event names; we map them onto this enum so the
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/// orchestrator can fan out a single handler.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum BnplEventKind {
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/// Authorisation was created (consumer accepted offer).
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AuthorizationCreated,
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/// Capture occurred.
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CaptureCreated,
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/// Refund was processed.
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RefundCreated,
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/// Consumer raised a dispute.
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DisputeCreated,
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/// Merchant or processor opened a chargeback.
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ChargebackOpened,
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/// Catch-all for provider-native event names we don't have a
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/// dedicated variant for.
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Other,
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}
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impl BnplEventKind {
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/// Map a provider-native event name to a normalised kind.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn from_event_name(s: &str) -> Self {
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match s {
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"authorization.created" | "auth" | "authorized" | "AUTHORISED" => {
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Self::AuthorizationCreated
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}
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"capture.created" | "capture" | "captured" | "CAPTURED" => Self::CaptureCreated,
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"refund.created" | "refund" | "refunded" | "REFUNDED" => Self::RefundCreated,
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"dispute.created" | "dispute" | "DISPUTED" => Self::DisputeCreated,
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"chargeback.opened" | "chargeback" | "CHARGEBACK_OPENED" => Self::ChargebackOpened,
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_ => Self::Other,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Normalised inbound event after signature verification + parsing.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct BnplEvent {
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/// Which provider sent it.
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pub provider: WebhookProvider,
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/// Normalised event kind.
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pub kind: BnplEventKind,
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/// Provider-issued event id.
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pub event_id: Option<String>,
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/// The provider-side resource id the event refers to (charge_id,
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/// order_id, payment_id...).
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pub resource_ref: Option<String>,
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/// Raw provider-native event name, preserved for diagnostics.
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pub raw_event: String,
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}
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/// Verify an Affirm webhook signature.
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///
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/// Affirm signs with HMAC-SHA256(secret, body), base64-encoded, sent
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/// in the `X-Affirm-Signature` header.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// [`Error::InvalidSignature`] if the digest mismatches.
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/// [`Error::MalformedSignatureHeader`] if the header isn't valid base64.
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pub fn verify_affirm_webhook(secret: &[u8], header_value: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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let provided = B64
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.decode(header_value.trim())
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.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(e.to_string()))?;
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verify_hmac_sha256(secret, body, &provided)
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}
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/// Verify a Klarna webhook signature.
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///
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/// Klarna's `Klarna-Signature` header carries a base64-encoded
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/// HMAC-SHA256 digest over the raw body.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// See [`verify_affirm_webhook`].
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pub fn verify_klarna_webhook(secret: &[u8], header_value: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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let provided = B64
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.decode(header_value.trim())
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.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(e.to_string()))?;
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verify_hmac_sha256(secret, body, &provided)
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}
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/// Verify an Afterpay / Clearpay webhook signature.
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///
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/// Afterpay sends a hex-encoded HMAC-SHA256 digest in
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/// `Afterpay-Signature` (or `Clearpay-Signature` for UK/EU merchants).
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// See [`verify_affirm_webhook`].
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pub fn verify_afterpay_webhook(secret: &[u8], header_value: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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let provided = hex::decode(header_value.trim())
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.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(e.to_string()))?;
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verify_hmac_sha256(secret, body, &provided)
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}
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/// Common HMAC-SHA256 verifier with constant-time compare.
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fn verify_hmac_sha256(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8], provided: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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if secret.is_empty() {
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return Err(Error::MalformedSignatureHeader("empty secret".into()));
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}
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let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret)
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.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(format!("hmac init: {e}")))?;
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mac.update(body);
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let computed = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
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if computed.ct_eq(provided).into() {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
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}
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct AffirmNative {
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#[serde(default)]
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id: Option<String>,
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#[serde(rename = "type", default)]
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kind: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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charge_id: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Parse + verify an Affirm webhook in one step.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// As per [`verify_affirm_webhook`] and JSON parsing.
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pub fn parse_affirm_event(
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secret: &[u8],
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header_value: &str,
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body: &[u8],
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) -> Result<BnplEvent> {
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verify_affirm_webhook(secret, header_value, body)?;
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let n: AffirmNative =
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serde_json::from_slice(body).map_err(|e| Error::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
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Ok(BnplEvent {
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provider: WebhookProvider::Affirm,
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kind: BnplEventKind::from_event_name(&n.kind),
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event_id: n.id,
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resource_ref: n.charge_id,
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raw_event: n.kind,
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})
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct KlarnaNative {
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#[serde(default)]
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event_id: Option<String>,
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#[serde(rename = "event_type", default)]
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kind: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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order_id: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Parse + verify a Klarna webhook.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// See [`verify_klarna_webhook`].
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pub fn parse_klarna_event(
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secret: &[u8],
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header_value: &str,
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body: &[u8],
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) -> Result<BnplEvent> {
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verify_klarna_webhook(secret, header_value, body)?;
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let n: KlarnaNative =
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serde_json::from_slice(body).map_err(|e| Error::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
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Ok(BnplEvent {
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provider: WebhookProvider::Klarna,
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kind: BnplEventKind::from_event_name(&n.kind),
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event_id: n.event_id,
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resource_ref: n.order_id,
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raw_event: n.kind,
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})
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct AfterpayNative {
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#[serde(default)]
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id: Option<String>,
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#[serde(rename = "eventType", default)]
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kind: String,
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#[serde(default, rename = "merchantReference")]
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merchant_reference: Option<String>,
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#[serde(default, rename = "paymentId")]
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payment_id: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Parse + verify an Afterpay / Clearpay webhook.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// See [`verify_afterpay_webhook`].
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pub fn parse_afterpay_event(
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secret: &[u8],
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header_value: &str,
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body: &[u8],
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) -> Result<BnplEvent> {
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verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, header_value, body)?;
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let n: AfterpayNative =
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serde_json::from_slice(body).map_err(|e| Error::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
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Ok(BnplEvent {
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provider: WebhookProvider::AfterpayClearpay,
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kind: BnplEventKind::from_event_name(&n.kind),
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event_id: n.id,
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resource_ref: n.payment_id.or(n.merchant_reference),
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raw_event: n.kind,
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})
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn sign_b64(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> String {
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let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).unwrap();
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mac.update(body);
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B64.encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
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}
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fn sign_hex(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> String {
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let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).unwrap();
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mac.update(body);
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hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
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}
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#[test]
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fn affirm_verify_positive() {
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let secret = b"affirm-secret";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"capture.created","charge_id":"c1"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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assert!(verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
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}
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#[test]
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fn affirm_verify_tampered_body() {
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let secret = b"affirm-secret";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"capture.created"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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let tampered = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"refund.created"}"#;
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assert!(matches!(
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verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &sig, tampered),
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Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
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));
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}
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#[test]
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fn affirm_verify_tampered_signature() {
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let secret = b"affirm-secret";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e1"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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let mut bad = sig;
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// Flip a base64 char to a definitely different (still-valid b64) one.
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if let Some(first) = bad.chars().next() {
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let new = if first == 'a' { 'b' } else { 'a' };
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bad.replace_range(..1, &new.to_string());
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}
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assert!(matches!(
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verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &bad, body),
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Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
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));
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}
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#[test]
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fn klarna_verify_positive() {
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let secret = b"klarna-secret";
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let body = br#"{"event_id":"e","event_type":"capture.created","order_id":"o"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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assert!(verify_klarna_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
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}
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#[test]
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fn afterpay_verify_positive_hex() {
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let secret = b"afterpay-secret";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e","eventType":"REFUNDED","paymentId":"p"}"#;
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let sig = sign_hex(secret, body);
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assert!(verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
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}
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#[test]
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fn afterpay_verify_malformed_header() {
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let secret = b"k";
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let body = b"{}";
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let r = verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, "not-hex!", body);
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assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(_))));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_affirm_event_round_trip() {
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let secret = b"k";
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let body = br#"{"id":"evt_1","type":"capture.created","charge_id":"ch_9"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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let evt = parse_affirm_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(evt.provider, WebhookProvider::Affirm);
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assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::CaptureCreated);
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assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("ch_9"));
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assert_eq!(evt.event_id.as_deref(), Some("evt_1"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_klarna_event_round_trip() {
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let secret = b"k";
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let body = br#"{"event_id":"e","event_type":"refund.created","order_id":"o1"}"#;
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let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
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let evt = parse_klarna_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::RefundCreated);
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assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("o1"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_afterpay_event_round_trip() {
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let secret = b"k";
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let body = br#"{"id":"e","eventType":"CHARGEBACK_OPENED","paymentId":"p1"}"#;
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let sig = sign_hex(secret, body);
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let evt = parse_afterpay_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::ChargebackOpened);
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}
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#[test]
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fn event_kind_mapping_handles_known() {
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assert_eq!(
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BnplEventKind::from_event_name("authorization.created"),
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BnplEventKind::AuthorizationCreated
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);
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assert_eq!(
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BnplEventKind::from_event_name("CAPTURED"),
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BnplEventKind::CaptureCreated
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);
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assert_eq!(
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BnplEventKind::from_event_name("nonsense"),
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BnplEventKind::Other
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);
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}
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}
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