open-standards/openpay/crates/op-bnpl/src/webhook.rs
Transaction Science 6575ff1eb7 Ingest batch 3: 9 more crates across openpay / smart-byte / eoc
openpay/ (+3 crates)
  op-bnpl/        Affirm + Klarna + Afterpay/Clearpay rails. Full lifecycle
                  typestate (Initiated→Approved→Captured→Settled→Refunded).
                  Per-provider sandbox+production base URLs, regions (NA/EU/OC
                  for Klarna; US/AuNz/Gb/Ca/Eu for Afterpay). HMAC-SHA256
                  webhook verification with constant-time compare. 61 tests.
  op-batch/       NACHA ACH (94-char records, PPD/CCD/WEB/TEL/CTX, R01-R99
                  return codes, Same-Day ACH cutoffs); SEPA pain.001.001.09
                  (CT) + pain.008.001.08 (DD) with SCT-Inst flagging; Fedwire
                  MT103/MT202/CHIPS + pacs.008.001.12 / pacs.009.001.10 +
                  UETR; Bacs Standard 18. Per-rail cutoff scheduler. Exception
                  taxonomy unified across rails. 51 tests.
  op-screening/   OFAC SDN + EU consolidated + UN consolidated + HMT UK
                  consolidated + Australia DFAT + Canada SEMA + Japan MOF.
                  Levenshtein + Jaro-Winkler + Soundex + Metaphone + token
                  Jaccard scoring. Unicode NFKD normalisation + Cyrillic /
                  Arabic transliteration. Ed25519-signed BLAKE3-chained
                  audit log. BSA helpers: CTR + SAR pattern detection
                  (structuring, round-dollar, rapid-in-out). 43 tests.

smart-byte/smart-byte-rs/ (+3 crates)
  smart-byte-bbs/      BBS+ signatures (IETF draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-08).
                       BLS12-381 keys, signatures, disclosure proofs with
                       cryptographic unlinkability. bbs-2023 Data Integrity
                       cryptosuite. AnonCreds-shaped link secrets +
                       predicate proofs. SecretKey zeroize-on-drop. 49 tests.
  smart-byte-didcomm/  DIDComm v2 messaging per DIF spec. Pack-encrypted
                       (ECDH-1PU + ECDH-ES via X25519), pack-signed (JWS),
                       pack-plaintext. Aries protocols: issue-credential v3,
                       present-proof v3, basic-message, trust-ping, discover-
                       features, out-of-band, coordinate-mediation, message-
                       pickup. Mediator role with pluggable storage. 23 tests.
  smart-byte-mdl/      ISO/IEC 18013-5 mobile driver's licence + 18013-7
                       online presentment. mDoc + MSO with salted-hash
                       selective disclosure (per item; SHA-256 digest tree).
                       org.iso.18013.5.1 namespace + AAMVA add-on. ES256
                       device-auth + issuer-auth. QR-code device-engagement
                       scaffolding. 28 tests.

eoc/eoc-rs/ (+3 crates)
  eoc-local/      Local-inference backends behind one NeuralBackend:
                  llama.cpp (GGUF, Q4/Q5/Q6/Q8/F16/F32 quantisation),
                  MLX (Apple Silicon, feature-gated), MLC-LLM (TVM, feature-
                  gated marker), ONNX Runtime. GGUF file-format reader.
                  HuggingFace tokenizers. Greedy / top-k / top-p / temperature /
                  Mirostat samplers. Model registry scanning ~/.eoc/models/.
                  Joule attribution via eoc-meter. 39 tests.
  eoc-rerank/     BM25 sparse + HNSW dense + RRF + min-max hybrid fusion.
                  Cohere v3.5 + Voyage v2 + bge-reranker v2-m3 + ms-marco
                  MiniLM + ColBERT v2 rerankers. Two-stage pipeline:
                  retrieve top-K hybrid → cross-encoder rerank → top-N.
                  KV-stage recovery shim into the cascade. 31 tests.
  eoc-eval/       15 canonical eval harnesses: MMLU, MMLU-Pro, GPQA,
                  HumanEval (pass@1 with python3 sandbox), BBH, IFEval (25
                  verifiable constraints), AlpacaEval, AGIEval, HellaSwag,
                  ARC (Easy + Challenge), TruthfulQA (MC1+MC2), BoolQ,
                  GSM8K, MATH (boxed-answer equivalence), Winogrande. Real
                  questions in BuiltinSamples. EvalRunner emits joules-per-
                  correct alongside accuracy. 49 tests.

Quality:
- cargo check across all three workspaces: clean
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings on every new crate: clean
- 374 new tests, all passing
- #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across every new crate
- No unwrap/expect outside #[cfg(test)]

Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 (inherited via root rust-toolchain.toml).
2026-05-24 01:09:35 -04:00

366 lines
12 KiB
Rust

//! Inbound webhook verification + event types.
//!
//! All three providers sign outbound webhooks with HMAC-SHA256 over
//! the raw request body. The signing key is provisioned by the
//! merchant per-provider:
//!
//! | Provider | Header name | Encoding |
//! |----------------------|------------------------------------------|----------|
//! | Affirm | `X-Affirm-Signature` | base64 |
//! | Klarna | `Klarna-Signature` | base64 |
//! | Afterpay / Clearpay | `Afterpay-Signature` / `Clearpay-Signature` | hex |
//!
//! We expose three verification helpers plus a unified [`BnplEvent`]
//! deserialiser. Verification is constant-time via `subtle::ConstantTimeEq`.
use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64};
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::Sha256;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
/// Which provider this event came from.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum WebhookProvider {
/// Affirm.
Affirm,
/// Klarna.
Klarna,
/// Afterpay or Clearpay.
AfterpayClearpay,
}
/// Normalised event kind across providers. Each provider emits its
/// own native event names; we map them onto this enum so the
/// orchestrator can fan out a single handler.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum BnplEventKind {
/// Authorisation was created (consumer accepted offer).
AuthorizationCreated,
/// Capture occurred.
CaptureCreated,
/// Refund was processed.
RefundCreated,
/// Consumer raised a dispute.
DisputeCreated,
/// Merchant or processor opened a chargeback.
ChargebackOpened,
/// Catch-all for provider-native event names we don't have a
/// dedicated variant for.
Other,
}
impl BnplEventKind {
/// Map a provider-native event name to a normalised kind.
#[must_use]
pub fn from_event_name(s: &str) -> Self {
match s {
"authorization.created" | "auth" | "authorized" | "AUTHORISED" => {
Self::AuthorizationCreated
}
"capture.created" | "capture" | "captured" | "CAPTURED" => Self::CaptureCreated,
"refund.created" | "refund" | "refunded" | "REFUNDED" => Self::RefundCreated,
"dispute.created" | "dispute" | "DISPUTED" => Self::DisputeCreated,
"chargeback.opened" | "chargeback" | "CHARGEBACK_OPENED" => Self::ChargebackOpened,
_ => Self::Other,
}
}
}
/// Normalised inbound event after signature verification + parsing.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct BnplEvent {
/// Which provider sent it.
pub provider: WebhookProvider,
/// Normalised event kind.
pub kind: BnplEventKind,
/// Provider-issued event id.
pub event_id: Option<String>,
/// The provider-side resource id the event refers to (charge_id,
/// order_id, payment_id...).
pub resource_ref: Option<String>,
/// Raw provider-native event name, preserved for diagnostics.
pub raw_event: String,
}
/// Verify an Affirm webhook signature.
///
/// Affirm signs with HMAC-SHA256(secret, body), base64-encoded, sent
/// in the `X-Affirm-Signature` header.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::InvalidSignature`] if the digest mismatches.
/// [`Error::MalformedSignatureHeader`] if the header isn't valid base64.
pub fn verify_affirm_webhook(secret: &[u8], header_value: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let provided = B64
.decode(header_value.trim())
.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(e.to_string()))?;
verify_hmac_sha256(secret, body, &provided)
}
/// Verify a Klarna webhook signature.
///
/// Klarna's `Klarna-Signature` header carries a base64-encoded
/// HMAC-SHA256 digest over the raw body.
///
/// # Errors
/// See [`verify_affirm_webhook`].
pub fn verify_klarna_webhook(secret: &[u8], header_value: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let provided = B64
.decode(header_value.trim())
.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(e.to_string()))?;
verify_hmac_sha256(secret, body, &provided)
}
/// Verify an Afterpay / Clearpay webhook signature.
///
/// Afterpay sends a hex-encoded HMAC-SHA256 digest in
/// `Afterpay-Signature` (or `Clearpay-Signature` for UK/EU merchants).
///
/// # Errors
/// See [`verify_affirm_webhook`].
pub fn verify_afterpay_webhook(secret: &[u8], header_value: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let provided = hex::decode(header_value.trim())
.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(e.to_string()))?;
verify_hmac_sha256(secret, body, &provided)
}
/// Common HMAC-SHA256 verifier with constant-time compare.
fn verify_hmac_sha256(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8], provided: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
if secret.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::MalformedSignatureHeader("empty secret".into()));
}
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret)
.map_err(|e| Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(format!("hmac init: {e}")))?;
mac.update(body);
let computed = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
if computed.ct_eq(provided).into() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct AffirmNative {
#[serde(default)]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "type", default)]
kind: String,
#[serde(default)]
charge_id: Option<String>,
}
/// Parse + verify an Affirm webhook in one step.
///
/// # Errors
/// As per [`verify_affirm_webhook`] and JSON parsing.
pub fn parse_affirm_event(
secret: &[u8],
header_value: &str,
body: &[u8],
) -> Result<BnplEvent> {
verify_affirm_webhook(secret, header_value, body)?;
let n: AffirmNative =
serde_json::from_slice(body).map_err(|e| Error::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(BnplEvent {
provider: WebhookProvider::Affirm,
kind: BnplEventKind::from_event_name(&n.kind),
event_id: n.id,
resource_ref: n.charge_id,
raw_event: n.kind,
})
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct KlarnaNative {
#[serde(default)]
event_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "event_type", default)]
kind: String,
#[serde(default)]
order_id: Option<String>,
}
/// Parse + verify a Klarna webhook.
///
/// # Errors
/// See [`verify_klarna_webhook`].
pub fn parse_klarna_event(
secret: &[u8],
header_value: &str,
body: &[u8],
) -> Result<BnplEvent> {
verify_klarna_webhook(secret, header_value, body)?;
let n: KlarnaNative =
serde_json::from_slice(body).map_err(|e| Error::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(BnplEvent {
provider: WebhookProvider::Klarna,
kind: BnplEventKind::from_event_name(&n.kind),
event_id: n.event_id,
resource_ref: n.order_id,
raw_event: n.kind,
})
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct AfterpayNative {
#[serde(default)]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "eventType", default)]
kind: String,
#[serde(default, rename = "merchantReference")]
merchant_reference: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, rename = "paymentId")]
payment_id: Option<String>,
}
/// Parse + verify an Afterpay / Clearpay webhook.
///
/// # Errors
/// See [`verify_afterpay_webhook`].
pub fn parse_afterpay_event(
secret: &[u8],
header_value: &str,
body: &[u8],
) -> Result<BnplEvent> {
verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, header_value, body)?;
let n: AfterpayNative =
serde_json::from_slice(body).map_err(|e| Error::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(BnplEvent {
provider: WebhookProvider::AfterpayClearpay,
kind: BnplEventKind::from_event_name(&n.kind),
event_id: n.id,
resource_ref: n.payment_id.or(n.merchant_reference),
raw_event: n.kind,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn sign_b64(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> String {
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).unwrap();
mac.update(body);
B64.encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
}
fn sign_hex(secret: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> String {
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).unwrap();
mac.update(body);
hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
}
#[test]
fn affirm_verify_positive() {
let secret = b"affirm-secret";
let body = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"capture.created","charge_id":"c1"}"#;
let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
assert!(verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn affirm_verify_tampered_body() {
let secret = b"affirm-secret";
let body = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"capture.created"}"#;
let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
let tampered = br#"{"id":"e1","type":"refund.created"}"#;
assert!(matches!(
verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &sig, tampered),
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
));
}
#[test]
fn affirm_verify_tampered_signature() {
let secret = b"affirm-secret";
let body = br#"{"id":"e1"}"#;
let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
let mut bad = sig;
// Flip a base64 char to a definitely different (still-valid b64) one.
if let Some(first) = bad.chars().next() {
let new = if first == 'a' { 'b' } else { 'a' };
bad.replace_range(..1, &new.to_string());
}
assert!(matches!(
verify_affirm_webhook(secret, &bad, body),
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
));
}
#[test]
fn klarna_verify_positive() {
let secret = b"klarna-secret";
let body = br#"{"event_id":"e","event_type":"capture.created","order_id":"o"}"#;
let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
assert!(verify_klarna_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn afterpay_verify_positive_hex() {
let secret = b"afterpay-secret";
let body = br#"{"id":"e","eventType":"REFUNDED","paymentId":"p"}"#;
let sig = sign_hex(secret, body);
assert!(verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, &sig, body).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn afterpay_verify_malformed_header() {
let secret = b"k";
let body = b"{}";
let r = verify_afterpay_webhook(secret, "not-hex!", body);
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::MalformedSignatureHeader(_))));
}
#[test]
fn parse_affirm_event_round_trip() {
let secret = b"k";
let body = br#"{"id":"evt_1","type":"capture.created","charge_id":"ch_9"}"#;
let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
let evt = parse_affirm_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
assert_eq!(evt.provider, WebhookProvider::Affirm);
assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::CaptureCreated);
assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("ch_9"));
assert_eq!(evt.event_id.as_deref(), Some("evt_1"));
}
#[test]
fn parse_klarna_event_round_trip() {
let secret = b"k";
let body = br#"{"event_id":"e","event_type":"refund.created","order_id":"o1"}"#;
let sig = sign_b64(secret, body);
let evt = parse_klarna_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::RefundCreated);
assert_eq!(evt.resource_ref.as_deref(), Some("o1"));
}
#[test]
fn parse_afterpay_event_round_trip() {
let secret = b"k";
let body = br#"{"id":"e","eventType":"CHARGEBACK_OPENED","paymentId":"p1"}"#;
let sig = sign_hex(secret, body);
let evt = parse_afterpay_event(secret, &sig, body).unwrap();
assert_eq!(evt.kind, BnplEventKind::ChargebackOpened);
}
#[test]
fn event_kind_mapping_handles_known() {
assert_eq!(
BnplEventKind::from_event_name("authorization.created"),
BnplEventKind::AuthorizationCreated
);
assert_eq!(
BnplEventKind::from_event_name("CAPTURED"),
BnplEventKind::CaptureCreated
);
assert_eq!(
BnplEventKind::from_event_name("nonsense"),
BnplEventKind::Other
);
}
}