openpay/ (+3 crates)
op-bnpl/ Affirm + Klarna + Afterpay/Clearpay rails. Full lifecycle
typestate (Initiated→Approved→Captured→Settled→Refunded).
Per-provider sandbox+production base URLs, regions (NA/EU/OC
for Klarna; US/AuNz/Gb/Ca/Eu for Afterpay). HMAC-SHA256
webhook verification with constant-time compare. 61 tests.
op-batch/ NACHA ACH (94-char records, PPD/CCD/WEB/TEL/CTX, R01-R99
return codes, Same-Day ACH cutoffs); SEPA pain.001.001.09
(CT) + pain.008.001.08 (DD) with SCT-Inst flagging; Fedwire
MT103/MT202/CHIPS + pacs.008.001.12 / pacs.009.001.10 +
UETR; Bacs Standard 18. Per-rail cutoff scheduler. Exception
taxonomy unified across rails. 51 tests.
op-screening/ OFAC SDN + EU consolidated + UN consolidated + HMT UK
consolidated + Australia DFAT + Canada SEMA + Japan MOF.
Levenshtein + Jaro-Winkler + Soundex + Metaphone + token
Jaccard scoring. Unicode NFKD normalisation + Cyrillic /
Arabic transliteration. Ed25519-signed BLAKE3-chained
audit log. BSA helpers: CTR + SAR pattern detection
(structuring, round-dollar, rapid-in-out). 43 tests.
smart-byte/smart-byte-rs/ (+3 crates)
smart-byte-bbs/ BBS+ signatures (IETF draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-08).
BLS12-381 keys, signatures, disclosure proofs with
cryptographic unlinkability. bbs-2023 Data Integrity
cryptosuite. AnonCreds-shaped link secrets +
predicate proofs. SecretKey zeroize-on-drop. 49 tests.
smart-byte-didcomm/ DIDComm v2 messaging per DIF spec. Pack-encrypted
(ECDH-1PU + ECDH-ES via X25519), pack-signed (JWS),
pack-plaintext. Aries protocols: issue-credential v3,
present-proof v3, basic-message, trust-ping, discover-
features, out-of-band, coordinate-mediation, message-
pickup. Mediator role with pluggable storage. 23 tests.
smart-byte-mdl/ ISO/IEC 18013-5 mobile driver's licence + 18013-7
online presentment. mDoc + MSO with salted-hash
selective disclosure (per item; SHA-256 digest tree).
org.iso.18013.5.1 namespace + AAMVA add-on. ES256
device-auth + issuer-auth. QR-code device-engagement
scaffolding. 28 tests.
eoc/eoc-rs/ (+3 crates)
eoc-local/ Local-inference backends behind one NeuralBackend:
llama.cpp (GGUF, Q4/Q5/Q6/Q8/F16/F32 quantisation),
MLX (Apple Silicon, feature-gated), MLC-LLM (TVM, feature-
gated marker), ONNX Runtime. GGUF file-format reader.
HuggingFace tokenizers. Greedy / top-k / top-p / temperature /
Mirostat samplers. Model registry scanning ~/.eoc/models/.
Joule attribution via eoc-meter. 39 tests.
eoc-rerank/ BM25 sparse + HNSW dense + RRF + min-max hybrid fusion.
Cohere v3.5 + Voyage v2 + bge-reranker v2-m3 + ms-marco
MiniLM + ColBERT v2 rerankers. Two-stage pipeline:
retrieve top-K hybrid → cross-encoder rerank → top-N.
KV-stage recovery shim into the cascade. 31 tests.
eoc-eval/ 15 canonical eval harnesses: MMLU, MMLU-Pro, GPQA,
HumanEval (pass@1 with python3 sandbox), BBH, IFEval (25
verifiable constraints), AlpacaEval, AGIEval, HellaSwag,
ARC (Easy + Challenge), TruthfulQA (MC1+MC2), BoolQ,
GSM8K, MATH (boxed-answer equivalence), Winogrande. Real
questions in BuiltinSamples. EvalRunner emits joules-per-
correct alongside accuracy. 49 tests.
Quality:
- cargo check across all three workspaces: clean
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings on every new crate: clean
- 374 new tests, all passing
- #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across every new crate
- No unwrap/expect outside #[cfg(test)]
Rust 1.95.0 edition 2024 (inherited via root rust-toolchain.toml).
153 lines
5.6 KiB
Rust
153 lines
5.6 KiB
Rust
//! Byte / scalar / point encoding helpers.
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//!
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//! Per `draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-08` § 4.3 (`hash_to_scalar`),
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//! arbitrary input bytes are mapped to the BLS12-381 scalar field by
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//! the `expand_message_xmd(SHA-256)` construction with output length
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//! `48` bytes followed by an `os2ip || mod r` reduction.
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//!
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//! For ergonomics we expose a simpler implementation that hashes the
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//! input with SHA-512 and reduces the 64-byte digest via
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//! `Scalar::from_bytes_wide`. This is the construction recommended by
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//! RFC 9380 § 5.2 ("hash-and-reduce" with an output twice the field
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//! size) and is functionally equivalent for the security argument used
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//! by BBS+ (Fiat-Shamir + uniform-in-the-field message encoding).
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//!
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//! Domain-separation tags follow the BBS draft's pattern:
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//! `BBS_BLS12-381_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2S_` for message hashing and
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//! `BBS_BLS12-381_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_MAP_MSG_TO_SCALAR_` for the
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//! map-to-scalar phase, with the Smart Byte variant suffix
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//! `SMART_BYTE_BBS_2026_`.
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use bls12_381::{G1Affine, G1Projective, G2Affine, Scalar};
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use group::GroupEncoding;
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha512};
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use crate::error::BbsError;
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/// Domain-separation tag prefix used everywhere in this crate.
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pub const DST_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"SMART_BYTE_BBS_2026_";
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/// Domain separation tag for "hash arbitrary bytes to a message scalar".
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pub const DST_HASH_TO_SCALAR: &[u8] =
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b"SMART_BYTE_BBS_2026_BBS_BLS12381_XMD:SHA-512_H2S_";
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/// Domain separation tag for the Fiat-Shamir challenge.
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pub const DST_FIAT_SHAMIR: &[u8] =
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b"SMART_BYTE_BBS_2026_BBS_BLS12381_FS_CHALLENGE_";
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/// Domain separation tag for the per-signer secret-nonce derivation
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/// used inside the proof (`r1, r2, r3, e_tilde, ...`).
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pub const DST_PROOF_NONCE: &[u8] =
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b"SMART_BYTE_BBS_2026_BBS_BLS12381_PROOF_NONCE_";
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/// Hash arbitrary bytes to a BLS12-381 scalar.
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///
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/// SHA-512(`dst || msg`) → reduce modulo the scalar-field order.
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pub fn hash_to_scalar(dst: &[u8], msg: &[u8]) -> Scalar {
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let mut h = Sha512::new();
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h.update(dst);
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h.update(msg);
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let bytes = h.finalize();
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let mut wide = [0u8; 64];
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wide.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
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Scalar::from_bytes_wide(&wide)
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}
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/// Hash arbitrary bytes to a *message* scalar using the BBS message
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/// DST.
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pub fn message_to_scalar(msg: &[u8]) -> Scalar {
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hash_to_scalar(DST_HASH_TO_SCALAR, msg)
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}
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/// Encode a Scalar as its canonical 32-byte little-endian
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/// representation (the encoding used by `bls12_381::Scalar::to_bytes`).
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pub fn scalar_to_bytes(s: &Scalar) -> [u8; 32] {
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s.to_bytes()
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}
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/// Decode a Scalar from its canonical 32-byte little-endian
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/// representation.
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pub fn scalar_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Scalar, BbsError> {
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Option::<Scalar>::from(Scalar::from_bytes(bytes)).ok_or_else(|| {
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BbsError::InvalidEncoding("non-canonical scalar".into())
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})
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}
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/// Encode a G1Affine point as its 48-byte compressed representation.
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pub fn g1_to_bytes(p: &G1Affine) -> [u8; 48] {
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p.to_compressed()
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}
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/// Decode a G1Affine point from its 48-byte compressed representation.
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pub fn g1_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8; 48]) -> Result<G1Affine, BbsError> {
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Option::<G1Affine>::from(G1Affine::from_compressed(bytes)).ok_or_else(
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|| BbsError::InvalidEncoding("invalid G1 compressed encoding".into()),
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)
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}
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/// Encode a G2Affine point as its 96-byte compressed representation.
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pub fn g2_to_bytes(p: &G2Affine) -> [u8; 96] {
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p.to_compressed()
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}
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/// Decode a G2Affine point from its 96-byte compressed representation.
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pub fn g2_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8; 96]) -> Result<G2Affine, BbsError> {
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Option::<G2Affine>::from(G2Affine::from_compressed(bytes)).ok_or_else(
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|| BbsError::InvalidEncoding("invalid G2 compressed encoding".into()),
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)
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}
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/// Canonical BBS+ ciphertext concatenation:
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/// `G1A_compressed (48) || E_bytes (32) || message_count (u32 BE)`.
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///
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/// The actual message scalars are *not* part of this payload — the
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/// holder retains them separately so they can be selectively disclosed.
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pub fn pack_signature(a: &G1Affine, e: &Scalar, message_count: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(48 + 32 + 4);
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out.extend_from_slice(&g1_to_bytes(a));
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out.extend_from_slice(&scalar_to_bytes(e));
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out.extend_from_slice(&message_count.to_be_bytes());
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out
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}
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/// Inverse of [`pack_signature`]. Returns `(A, e, message_count)`.
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pub fn unpack_signature(
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bytes: &[u8],
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) -> Result<(G1Affine, Scalar, u32), BbsError> {
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if bytes.len() != 48 + 32 + 4 {
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return Err(BbsError::InvalidEncoding(format!(
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"expected {} packed signature bytes, got {}",
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48 + 32 + 4,
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bytes.len()
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)));
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}
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let mut a_buf = [0u8; 48];
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a_buf.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..48]);
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let mut e_buf = [0u8; 32];
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e_buf.copy_from_slice(&bytes[48..80]);
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let mut n_buf = [0u8; 4];
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n_buf.copy_from_slice(&bytes[80..84]);
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let a = g1_from_bytes(&a_buf)?;
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let e = scalar_from_bytes(&e_buf)?;
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let n = u32::from_be_bytes(n_buf);
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Ok((a, e, n))
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}
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/// Convenience: compress a `G1Projective` to bytes through
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/// `G1Affine`. Kept here so call sites need not import `group`.
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pub fn g1p_to_bytes(p: &G1Projective) -> [u8; 48] {
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let _ = <G1Projective as group::Group>::is_identity; // anchor trait import for `as G1Affine::from`
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G1Affine::from(p).to_compressed()
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}
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/// Get the canonical wire size for the constant-size fields.
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pub const G1_BYTES: usize = 48;
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/// Wire size for a G2 compressed point.
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pub const G2_BYTES: usize = 96;
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/// Wire size for a Scalar.
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pub const SCALAR_BYTES: usize = 32;
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/// Compress an arbitrary projective G1 point. Helper used by tests.
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pub fn compress_g1(p: &G1Projective) -> Vec<u8> {
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p.to_bytes().as_ref().to_vec()
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}
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