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The TDX path (#399) and its PCK chain check (#415) had only met quotes this crate built itself. This runs the reference host inside a TDX guest and records the result as evidence anyone can re-check offline. sandbox-runtime examples: - confidential_run_tdx, run inside the guest. It takes quotes through configfs-tsm and derives the PCK anchor from a probe quote's chain, checked to Intel's root, which the verifier's side supplies. It seals an S6 run against a challenge, then checks the attestation: verified against the challenge, refused against another and against none. - verify_run now reads the evidence kind. For TDX its anchor argument is Intel's root, and the PCK is derived from the quote's chain checked to it. SEV-SNP is unchanged, and the 2026-10-21 SEV-SNP evidence still verifies. - sandbox-runtime's dev-dependencies enable sandbox-tee's intel-pcs feature for these examples. sandbox/proof/hardware/2026-10-21-tdx: the attestation (with the DCAP v4 quote), the challenge, Intel's published root certificate, and a README saying what it shows and what it does not. The unit is a placeholder and revocation lists were not consulted. Checked on our side, away from the guest: - The quote's chain is PCK Certificate, then PCK Platform CA, then Root CA, and its root is byte-identical to Intel's published root (SHA-256 44:A0:19:6B:…:74:D3). - verify_run on the build host verifies the run, and refuses another challenge and no challenge. - An attestation with its outcome changed is refused (report-data binding mismatch). - Another certificate given as the root yields no anchor. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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