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The run path sealed and verified SEV-SNP only: TeeConfig held a VCEK and
both seal and verify_run_evidence called verify_snp, so a TDX guest could
not run a confidential unit. Wiring TDX in exposed a soundness gap first.
verify_tdx took the PCK key from the quote's own certification data and
checked the QE report against it, so any quote that was consistent with
itself, endorsed by a key its maker generated, verified.
sandbox-tee:
- verify_tdx takes the PCK key the verifier pinned (from Intel's PCS, its
chain checked, as a VCEK comes from AMD's KDS); the quote must carry that
key, and the QE report is checked against it.
- TeeAnchor { SevSnp(vcek), Tdx(pck) } and verify_report dispatch on it.
- LocalTdxProvider: a software-grounded TDX provider (real ECDSA-P256, dev
keys, Grounding::Software), the TDX counterpart of LocalSnpProvider; the
test-only quote builder becomes the crate-visible local_quote.
- ConfigfsTsmProvider is no longer hard-coded to SEV-SNP: for_kind(kind),
and a report is refused when the kernel's `provider` attribute names
another platform (tsm_provider_kind: sev_guest, tdx_guest).
sandbox-runtime:
- TeeConfig.anchor replaces TeeConfig.vcek. Sealing refuses a provider and
anchor of different kinds, then verifies through verify_report.
- verify_run_evidence takes the verifier's anchor and refuses evidence of
another kind.
sandbox-cli is updated to the anchor.
SPEC §7.6: the anchor rule (a report is trusted through a key the verifier
pins, never one it carries) and the TDX PCK rule. The §9 readiness row is
updated.
Tests:
- A quote endorsed by its own PCK is refused.
- A local TDX quote verifies against its PCK.
- TSM provider names map to kinds.
- A report of another platform kind is refused.
- A confidential run on TDX is sealed and verified, and refused for another
challenge, outcome, PCK or kind.
- A provider and anchor of different kinds cannot seal.
Mutation testing: 10 mutants; 9 killed, 1 equivalent (checking the QE
report with the quote's PCK once it is pinned equal).
Verified on the build host: sandbox-rs 427 tests (--locked), sandbox-tee
with amd-kds, and every conformance class; clippy -D warnings clean on
sandbox-tee, -runtime, -cli. Repo checks pass, including lockfiles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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