open-standards/mesh/SPEC.md
Transaction Science 2f3b000153 mesh: a typed decision is a unit of work this spec could not measure
Decision models — state plus typed questions in, a calibrated probability per
allowed answer out, no text generated — went from nonexistent to a category
between 2026-09-15 and 2026-10-01, converging on three primitives (`noul`,
`choice`, `score`) and one schema. Every quantity in Mesh is a token count, and
a decision emits no tokens, so the spec could neither price one, rate one, nor
report one. Three defects, each checked in the code rather than inferred:

  - `MeshReceipt::uj_per_accepted_token`, documented as "the wedge metric", is
    `checked_div` by `tokens_accepted`. A decision's is 0 — measured
    `"output_tokens": 0` on every request — so the headline efficiency figure
    returned `None` for the whole category. The receipt sealed with no number.
  - `estimate()` charged `prompt_tokens + max_tokens`, so a caller that left
    `max_tokens` at a generation's default was priced for an essay the backend
    will never write, and refused at a ceiling that would have covered the work.
  - Nothing could express the dimension a decision's cost actually follows: the
    schema it scores. One question over 20 options is more work than one over 2
    at identical token counts.

Added `DecisionShape` on the request and `DecisionOutcome` on the outcome
(questions, options scored, and how much of the input was schema rather than
state), `CostProfile::with_option_cost` + `estimate_decision_uj`, and
`uj_per_decision` / `uj_per_option_scored` on the receipt. SPEC §3.6 states the
three MUSTs; §4's estimate formula and §6's field table are updated.

Additive throughout, following the pattern `CostProfile::calibration` already
set here: the new fields are `Option`, skipped when absent, and a declared
option cost of zero reproduces the token-only model exactly. So an existing
request's `request_id` is unchanged, a generation's signed core gains no keys,
and **the sealed conformance vectors in `conformance/v1/reference` still verify
byte-identically** — which is the real test that this is compatible, and it
passes. 52 tests, 0 failures, 0 clippy findings.

Two of the four new tests are the defects stated as invariants: a decision
receipt now has an efficiency figure where the token metric has none, and a
decision is not priced for tokens it never emits. Both were falsified by
reverting the fix — removing the `estimate()` branch fails two router tests,
making `uj_per_decision` read `tokens_accepted` fails two receipt tests.

`tools/joules-per-decision/` is the evidence: a harness that meters a real
Apache-2.0 decision model (Laya, ModernBERT-large 421M, via MLX) per fabric on
Apple silicon, and the numbers in §3.6 come from it. On an M5 Max a
three-question decision costs **0.104 J** — 0.0966 J on the GPU rail plus
0.0075 J of process CPU energy — at an 11.85 ms p50, which is ~35 mJ per
answered question. Idle baselines bracket the run and correct it by 0.08%, so
the figure is measurement, not modelling. The energy counters are read
unprivileged; the CPU-rail/GPU-rail asymmetry on macOS is noted there and is
the subject of follow-up work on `jcp-energy`.

The harness also reproduced a live defect in the category it measures: the
published Laya checkpoint ships a fitted temperature of 0.1006 for choice
questions with 11+ options, which sharpens logits roughly tenfold and reports
near-certainty on what may be a coin flip. A third-party porter found it by
reproducing upstream numerically and clamps it with a warning; the publisher
ships it. A calibrated probability is a claim, and this category ships claims
with no receipt — which is the argument for §3.6 in one line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-05 07:20:58 -04:00

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# Mesh — Energy-Accounted Inference Serving & Routing
**Version:** 0.1.0-draft.1 · **Status:** Draft · **Profile:** `mesh/1`
**Specification text:** CC-BY-4.0 · **Reference code (`mesh-rs/`):** Apache-2.0
Mesh is the open standard for **serving and routing inference as a metered
transaction**. A request declares a joule ceiling and a fidelity floor; the mesh
routes it to the cheapest-sufficient model on the cheapest-sufficient backend,
serves it under an energy meter, and seals a receipt whose headline figure is
**microjoules per accepted output token** — measured at the meter, not estimated
from a price list.
Mesh is one of the [Transaction Science open standards](../README.md).
Transaction Science is the steward, not the proprietor: the wire format and the
right to fork are public.
---
## §1 Why Mesh exists
The serving shelf reports two numbers: dollars per token and tokens per second.
Neither tells an operator, an auditor, or a regulator what an inference **cost**
— in the one unit that is physical, comparable across hardware, and impossible to
inflate: the joule. Mesh makes that number first-class. Every served inference
produces a signed receipt carrying the route that was taken and *why*, the recipe
that served it, the honest provenance of the energy figure, and the joules per
accepted token.
Mesh does not replace the runtime that executes one inference, nor the substrate
that supplies the compute. It is the **front door** in front of many models and
many backends: the layer that decides where a request goes, meters what it spent,
and proves it (§9).
---
## §2 Roles and the serve lifecycle
A Mesh deployment has four roles:
- **Caller** — issues a `ServeRequest` and, optionally, the JCP grant that
authorises it.
- **Router** — selects a backend (§4).
- **Engine** — a backend that serves the request (§5).
- **Steward** — the endpoint that meters the span (§5/§6) and seals the receipt
(§6). The steward identity is the COSE `kid` and signs the receipt log.
One serve proceeds in four phases, in order:
1. **Authorise.** If the request rides on a JCP `SignedGrant`, the steward MUST
verify the issuer signature, confirm the capability permits the action
`infer` on the request's content id, and confirm the grant's joule budget is
≥ the request's joule ceiling. A failure at any step aborts the serve before
any work is done.
2. **Route.** The router selects the cheapest admissible backend (§4). If none is
admissible, the serve fails with the router's recorded reason.
3. **Meter.** The steward opens an energy window, calls the engine, and closes
the window. Energy MUST be metered **around** the engine; an engine MUST NOT
self-report energy.
4. **Seal.** The steward builds the receipt (§6), stamps it into its hash-chained
log, and seals it as a JCR-1 envelope.
---
## §3 The request and the energy record
### §3.1 `ServeRequest`
A request is content-addressed. Its identity `request_id = ContentId.of(request)`
is the resource a JCP capability authorises and the `request_id` on the receipt.
| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `prompt_hash` | ContentId (BLAKE3) | content address of the prompt bytes — never the prompt text |
| `prompt_tokens` | u32 | declared input token count (for the estimate) |
| `max_tokens` | u32 | output token ceiling |
| `fidelity_floor` | Fidelity | minimum acceptable fidelity (§3.2) |
| `joule_ceiling_uj` | u64 | hard energy budget, microjoules |
A conforming request MUST carry both a `fidelity_floor` and a `joule_ceiling_uj`.
The pair is the contract: *give me an answer at least this good, for at most this
much energy.*
A request MAY additionally carry a `decision` (§3.6), which says it is asking for
a bounded typed decision rather than generated text. Its absence is a generation,
and is omitted from the canonical form — so the `request_id` of every request
written before this field existed is unchanged.
### §3.2 Fidelity
Fidelity is an ordered scale `F0 … F4` — `F0` the coarsest sufficient answer
(cache / lawful / tiny model), `F4` a frontier-grade response. Ordering is
normative: a backend is admissible only when its level ≥ the request's floor
(§4).
### §3.3 Energy and provenance
Energy is a two-part integer-microjoule record with an honest provenance tag:
```
Energy { measured_uj: Option<u64>, estimated_uj: u64, provenance: Provenance }
Provenance ∈ { HwShunt, ModelBased, Estimator }
```
The coupling is normative and MUST be enforced before a receipt is sealed:
- `HwShunt` ⇒ `measured_uj` is present (a hardware reading exists).
- `Estimator` ⇒ `measured_uj` is absent (no measurement is implied).
- `ModelBased` ⇒ `measured_uj` MAY be absent.
A receipt that violates the coupling MUST NOT be sealable. This is the rule that
keeps "measured" honest: a deployment with no hardware meter reports `Estimator`
and says so, rather than dressing an estimate up as a measurement.
`HwShunt` covers a shunt and a vendor energy counter (RAPL, NVML, Apple
IOReport), but a counter counts only while it is live:
> A reading from a vendor energy counter (RAPL, NVML, Apple IOReport, …) MAY be
> graded as a hardware reading only while the counter is demonstrably live for
> the domain the figure claims: the implementation MUST have observed the
> counter covering that domain advance under load (for Apple IOReport: the CPU
> energy rail itself advancing in at least 5 sample intervals, in at least 4 of
> every 5, over at least 300 ms while the probing thread burns CPU). A counter
> that is present but not live — frozen, or republished in lumps — MUST NOT
> produce a hardware-graded figure; the implementation falls back to its
> estimator or reports the work unmetered, and SHOULD record why. A figure MUST
> NOT claim coverage of a domain its counter does not read; where the format
> has a coverage field, such a figure is Partial.
`mesh/1` has no coverage field. So a figure from a counter that does not cover
the whole request, such as a GPU counter on a host whose CPU has none, MUST NOT
be graded `HwShunt`.
### §3.6 Typed decisions — the other unit of work
A **decision model** takes state plus typed questions and returns a calibrated
probability per allowed answer, generating no text. The category converged
through 2026 on three primitives — a proposition (`noul`), a choice over 1–255
named options, and a score over an ordered rubric — and backends score the
schema **non-autoregressively** rather than emitting tokens.
Everything else in this spec measures work in tokens, and a decision's output
token count is zero. Measured on a 421M decision model: `output_tokens: 0`, with
132 input tokens of which **121 were the question schema and 11 the state under
judgement**. Three consequences follow, and a conforming implementation MUST
handle each.
A request asking for a decision carries:
| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `questions` | u32 | typed questions in the request |
| `options_scored` | u32 | options scored across all of them |
| `schema_tokens` | u32 | how many of `prompt_tokens` are schema, not state |
1. **It MUST NOT be priced for tokens it cannot emit.** The estimate for a
decision MUST exclude `max_tokens`. Including it refuses work at a ceiling
that would in fact have covered it.
2. **Cost MUST be allowed to follow the schema.** A profile MAY declare a cost
per scored option; one question over 20 options is more work than one over 2
at identical token counts, and no token count expresses the difference.
Declaring nothing reproduces the token-only model exactly, so an unmeasured
profile claims nothing.
3. **The efficiency figure MUST be defined.** `uj_per_accepted_token` (§6) is
undefined when no tokens were accepted, which is every request in this
category. A decision receipt MUST instead carry `uj_per_decision`, and
SHOULD carry `uj_per_option_scored`. The unit of work is the answered
question.
`schema_tokens` is reported because a fixed schema is a **cacheable input
prefix** — distinct from `cache_hit_tokens`, which counts output tokens served
from cache, of which a decision has none. In the measured request 92% of the
input was schema, so a reader that cannot see the split cannot tell a cold
decision from a warm one.
> **Why a decision receipt is worth more than a generation receipt.** A decision
> is a single forward pass with no sampling. Given the weight digest, revision
> and numeric precision, it is reproducible — so a receipt over one is verifiable
> **by re-execution**, which a receipt over sampled text can never be. A receipt
> for a decision SHOULD therefore bind the weight digest and the precision; the
> probabilities of a published decision model differ between `fp16` and `fp32`
> even where the selected answer agrees, so a receipt that omits precision does
> not reproduce.
---
## §4 Routing — cheapest-sufficient
For each registered backend the router computes an estimate
`est_total_uj = uj_per_token × (prompt_tokens + max_tokens)`, or for a typed
decision (§3.6) `uj_per_token × prompt_tokens + uj_per_option_scored ×
options_scored`, and marks it **admissible** iff:
```
backend.fidelity ≥ request.fidelity_floor AND est_total_uj ≤ request.joule_ceiling_uj
```
The router MUST choose the admissible backend with the **lowest** `est_total_uj`.
Ties are broken deterministically (registration order). When no backend is
admissible the serve fails, and the decision records why.
The router MUST record, for every backend it weighed, a `RouteCandidate` with its
fidelity, estimate, admissibility, and — when inadmissible — a human-readable
reason (below floor / over ceiling). The chosen route MUST carry a one-line
justification. This is what makes a route **auditable from the receipt alone**:
the cheapest sufficient answer is preferred and a frontier model is the expensive
last resort, and the comparison is denominated in joules.
A model is addressed as a **recipe** — a base plus optional merges/adapters — not
a fixed blob, so the receipt can record *which* composed model answered.
---
## §5 The serving engine
A backend implements one interface: advertise a fidelity level and a modeled
per-token energy cost, and serve a request producing tokens and a `ServeOutcome`:
```
ServeOutcome {
tokens_in, tokens_out, tokens_accepted,
cache_hit_tokens, spec_proposed, spec_accepted
}
```
The input token payload travels **with** the serve call, alongside the request —
it is never part of the request's sealed identity and never enters the receipt,
which records only the content-addressed `prompt_hash` (§3.1). A receipt is
therefore safe to publish without disclosing the prompt.
`tokens_accepted` is the denominator of the wedge metric. For greedy decode it
equals `tokens_out`; under speculative decoding it is the number of proposed
tokens the target model accepted. `cache_hit_tokens` records output served from a
prefix/result cache (energy saved). An engine MUST do real work proportional to
the tokens it serves so the surrounding meter reads a real span; it MUST NOT
self-report energy.
The reference engine (`mesh-engine::ReferenceEngine`) is deterministic and
weights-free, for conformance. Production backends — a quantized device-resident
decoder, a high-throughput batching server — implement the same interface and
drop in unchanged; `mesh-engine-gguf::GgufEngine` (behind the `gguf` feature) is
one such backend over a pure-Rust GGUF/Metal decoder, so the mesh routes and
meters real model tokens.
---
## §6 The receipt — `mesh/1`
A `MeshReceipt` is sealed with **JCR-1**: canonical det-CBOR (RFC 8949 §4.2.1)
inside a COSE_Sign1 envelope (RFC 9052, EdDSA/Ed25519, `alg = -8`), byte-compatible
with the rest of the family's receipts. The signed core forbids floats, booleans,
and nulls; booleans are encoded as `0|1` uints and absent options dropped.
### §6.1 Wire fields (`mesh/1`)
| Key | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `mesh_receipt` | `"mesh/1"` |
| `request_id` | hex content id of the request |
| `grant_id` | hex JCP grant id this inference debited (omitted if ungranted) |
| `backend`, `recipe` | the backend and composed model that served it |
| `route` | the router's one-line justification |
| `tokens_in/out/accepted`, `cache_hit_tokens`, `spec_proposed/accepted` | the outcome counters |
| `fidelity_floor` | the floor the request demanded (uint) |
| `fidelity_met` | `0|1` — did the served backend meet the floor |
| `estimated_uj` | always present |
| `measured_uj` | present **iff** provenance is `HwShunt` |
| `uj_per_accepted_token` | **the wedge metric** for a generation — `energy.uj() / tokens_accepted`; omitted when no tokens were accepted |
| `questions_answered`, `options_scored`, `schema_tokens` | present **iff** the request was a typed decision (§3.6) |
| `uj_per_decision` | **the wedge metric** for a decision — `energy.uj() / questions_answered` |
| `uj_per_option_scored` | the finer decision figure — `energy.uj() / options_scored` |
| `energy_provenance` | `HwShunt | ModelBased | Estimator` |
| `sequence`, `prev` | hash-chain position and prior envelope's content id |
| `nonce`, `steward` | per-receipt nonce and the sealing identity (COSE `kid`) |
### §6.2 The wedge metric
`uj_per_accepted_token = energy.uj() / tokens_accepted`, where `energy.uj()` is
the measured figure if present, else the estimate. It is `null`/absent when no
tokens were accepted. This is the number Mesh exists to make legible, and it is
sealed into every receipt.
### §6.3 Hash chain
A steward keeps a receipt log. Appending a receipt stamps its `sequence` (from 0)
and `prev` (the content id of the previous sealed envelope; absent at genesis),
seals it, and advances the head. The log is tamper-evident end to end: altering
any envelope breaks verification of that receipt and the chain link from the next.
---
## §7 Conformance
A conforming implementation MUST:
1. Reject a serve whose grant fails verification, does not permit `infer` on the
request, or carries a budget below the request's joule ceiling (§2.1).
2. Choose the cheapest admissible backend and record every candidate weighed
(§4).
3. Meter energy around the engine and tag provenance honestly, enforcing the
`Energy` coupling before sealing (§3.3).
4. Seal the receipt as a JCR-1 `mesh/1` envelope and compute
`uj_per_accepted_token` (§6).
5. Maintain a tamper-evident hash chain (§6.3).
The published vectors in [`../conformance/v1/`](../conformance/v1/) pin a
deterministic reference serve. `reference/signed_core.hex` MUST canonical-CBOR
encode identically across implementations, and `reference/envelope.hex` MUST be
reproducible from it with the steward key in `meta.json`. Regenerate with:
```text
cargo run -p mesh-conformance --bin gen-vectors -- ../conformance/v1
```
---
## §8 Security considerations
Mesh composes proven primitives: Ed25519 signatures, BLAKE3 content addressing,
RFC 9052 COSE_Sign1, and the JCP capability model. It introduces no new
cryptography. Two properties are correctness, not style:
- **Authorisation happens outside the model.** The grant check (§2.1) is enforced
by the steward before any inference runs; a prompt cannot grant itself budget
or capability.
- **Honesty is enforced at seal time.** A receipt cannot claim a measurement it
does not have (§3.3). An operator without a hardware meter produces honest
`Estimator` receipts.
Energy figures are only as honest as the worst meter in the span. A receipt's
provenance tag states which meter produced its figure; consumers SHOULD treat
`Estimator` figures as bounds, not measurements.
---
## §9 Relationship to the family
Mesh is the serving + routing fabric. It is expressed in primitives the family
already publishes, and it composes with the neighbouring standards rather than
duplicating them:
- It **rides on [JCP](../jcp/)**: a serve request is authorised by a JCP `Grant`
(capability ⊗ joule-budget), and the receipt seals in JCR-1 — the same envelope
every family receipt uses.
- It **dispatches to runtimes** such as [JouleClaw](../jouleclaw/): a backend that
executes one inference cheaply is one engine behind the mesh.
- It **routes across compute** described by [EOC](../eoc/) and isolated by
[Sandbox](../sandbox/): a backend may be a metered, attested execution target.
The boundary is deliberate: a runtime executes *one* inference; Mesh routes
across *many* models and *many* backends and proves what each one cost.